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Abstract
We consider optimal monetary stabilization policy in a New Keynesian
model with explicit microfoundations, when the central bank recognizes that
private-sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes
to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs close
enough to model-consistency. We show how to characterize robustly optimal
policy without restricting consideration a priori to a particular parametric fam-
ily of candidate policy rules. We show that robustly optimal policy can be im-
plemented through commitment to a target criterion involving only the paths of
ination and a suitably dened output gap, but that a concern for robustness re-
quires greater resistance to surprise increases in ination than would be consid-
ered optimal if one could count on the private sector to have \rational expecta-
tions."
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1 Introduction
A central issue in macroeconomic policy analysis is the need to take account of the
likely changes in people's expectations about the future | not just what they expect
is most likely to happen, but also the degree of certainty that they attach to that
expectation | that should result from the adoption of one policy or another, and
also from one way or another of explaining that policy to the public. This is a
key issue because expectations are a crucial determinant of rational behavior, and
to the extent that one seeks to analyze the consequences of a policy by asking how
it changes the behavior that one expects from rational decisionmakers, one must
consider the question of how one expects the policy to aect people's expectations
about their future conditions and the future consequences of the alternative actions
(for example, alternative investment decisions) available to them now.
The most common approach to this question in analyses of macroeconomic pol-
icy over the past 30-40 years has been to assume \rational" (or model-consistent)
expectations on the part of all economic agents. In the case of each of some set of
contemplated policies, one determines the outcome (meaning, the predicted state-
contingent evolution of the economy over some horizon that may extend far, or even
indenitely, into the future) that would represent a rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) according to one's model, under the policy in question. One then compares
the outcomes under these dierent REE associated with the dierent policies, in order
to decide which policy is preferable. Yet, there are important reasons to doubt the
reliability of policy evaluation exercises that are based | or at least that are solely
based | on models that assume that whatever policy may be adopted, everyone in
the economy will necessarily (and immediately) understand the consequences of the
policy commitment in exactly the same way as the policy analyst does.
While this is certainly a hypothesis of appealing simplicity and generality, it is
both a very strong (i.e., restrictive) hypothesis and one of doubtful realism. Even if
one is willing to suppose that people are thoroughly rational and possess extraordinary
abilities at calculation, it is hardly obvious that they must forecast the economy's
evolution in the same way as an economist's own model forecasts it; for even if
the model is completely correct, there will be many other possible models of the
economy's probabilistic evolution that are (i) internally consistent, and (ii) not plainly
contradicted by observations of the economy's evolution in the past (in particular,
over the relatively short sample of past observations that will be available in practice).
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The assumption is an even more heroic one in the case that a change in policy is
contemplated, relative to the pattern of conduct of policy with which people will
have had experience in the past. Hence one should be cautious about drawing strong
conclusions about the character of desirable policies solely on the basis of an analysis
that maintains this assumption.
Here we explore a dierent approach, under which the policy analyst should not
pretend to be able to model the precise way in which people will form expectations
if a particular policy is adopted. Instead, under our recommended approach, the
policy analyst recognizes that the public's beliefs might be anything in a certain
set of possible beliefs, satisfying the requirements of (i) internal consistency, and
(ii) not being too grossly inconsistent with what actually happens in equilibrium,
when people act on the basis of those beliefs. These requirements reduce to the
familiar assumption of model-consistent (\rational") expectations if the words \not
too grossly inconsistent" are replaced by \completely consistent."1 The weakening
of the standard requirement of model-consistent expectations is motivated by the
recognition that it makes sense to expect people's beliefs to take account of patterns
in their environment that are clear enough to be obvious after even a modest period
of observation, while there is much less reason to expect them to have rejected an
alternative hypothesis that is not easily distinguishable from the true model after
only a series of observations of modest length.2
Under this approach, the economic analyst's model will associate with each con-
templated policy not a unique prediction about what people in the economy will
expect under that policy, but rather a range of possible forecasts; and there will
correspondingly be a range of possible predictions for economic outcomes under the
policy, rather than a unique prediction. In essence, it is proposed that one's economic
model be used to place bounds on what can occur under a given policy, rather than
expecting a point prediction. This does not mean that there will be no ground for
choice among alternative policies. While the economic analyst will not able to assert
with condence that a better outcome must occur if a given policy is adopted, one
1The more general proposal is termed an assumption of \near-rational expectations" in Woodford
(2010).
2Of course, the content of the proposal depends on the precise denition that is proposed for
the criterion of \not being too grossly inconsistent" with the true pattern | or more precisely, the
pattern predicted by the economic analyst's own model.
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may well prefer the range of possible outcomes associated with one policy rather than
another. Woodford (2010) proposes, in the spirit of the literatures on \ambiguity aver-
sion" and on \robust control"3 that one should choose a policy that ensures as high
as possible a value of one's objective under any of the set of possible outcomes asso-
ciated with that policy (or alternatively, that ensures that a certain \satiscing" level
of the policy objective can be ensured under as broad as possible a range of possible
departures from model-consistent expectations). Under a particular precise denition
of what it means for expectations to be suciently close to model-consistency, this
criterion again allows a unique policy to be recommended. It will, however, dier
in general from the one that would be selected if one were condent that people's
expectations would have to be fully consistent with the predictions of one's model.
As in Woodford (2010), we explore the consequences of such a concern for ro-
bustness under a particular interpretation of the requirement of \near-rational ex-
pectations." We suppose that the policy analyst assumes that people's beliefs will be
absolutely continuous with respect to the measure implied by her own model4 and
that she furthermore assumes that their beliefs will not be too dierent from the pre-
diction of her model, where the distance is measured by a relative entropy criterion.
A policy can then be said to be \robustly optimal" if it guarantees as high as possible
a value of the policymaker's objective, under any of the subjective beliefs consistent
with the above criterion. This very non-parametric way of specifying the range of
beliefs that are \close enough" to the policy analyst's own beliefs to be considered
as possible is based on the approach to bounding possible model mis-specications
in the robust policy analysis of Hansen and Sargent (2005).5 It has the advantage,
3See Hansen and Sargent (2008, 2011) for a discussion of these ideas and their application to
decision problems arising in macroeconomics.
4This implies that people correctly identify zero-probability events as having zero probability,
though they may dier in the probability they assign to events that occur with positive probability
according to her model.
5Our use of this measure of departure from model-consistent expectations is somewhat dierent
from theirs, however. Hansen and Sargent assume a policy analyst who is herself uncertain that her
model is precisely correct as a description of the economy; when the expectations of other economic
agents are an issue in the analysis, these are typically assumed to share the policy analyst's model,
and her concerns about mis-specication and preference for robustness as well. We are instead
concerned about potential discrepancies between the views of the policy analyst and those of the
public; and the potential departures from model-consistent beliefs on the part of the public are not
assumed to reect a concern for robustness on their part. In Benigno and Paciello (2010), instead,
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in our view, of allowing us to be fairly agnostic about the nature of the possible
alternative beliefs that may be entertained by the public, while at the same time
retaining a high degree of theoretical parsimony. Even given the proposed denition
of \near-rationality," there remains a decision to be made about how large a value of
the relative entropy should be contemplated by the policy analyst; but this simply
denes a one-parameter family of robustly optimal policies, indexed by a parameter
that can be taken to measure the policy analyst's degree of concern for the robustness
of the policy to possible departures from model-consistent expectations.
Woodford (2010) illustrates the possibility of policy analysis in accordance with
this proposal, in the context of a familiar log-linear New Keynesian model of the trade-
o between ination and output stabilization.6 Here we re-examine the conclusions
of that paper, in the context of a model with explicit choice-theoretic foundations.
It is not obvious from the analysis in the earlier paper whether the allowance for
near-rational expectations in a more explicit, non-linear model of the decision prob-
lems of economic agents would yield similar conclusions; for while the solution to
the linear-quadratic policy problem assumed in Woodford (2010) can be shown to
provide a local approximation to the dynamics under an optimal policy commitment
in a microfounded New Keynesian model under rational expectations (Benigno and
Woodford, (2005)), it is not obvious that the proposed modication of these equations
when expectations are allowed not to be model-consistent can similarly be justied as
a local approximation.7 Here we derive exact, nonlinear equations that characterize
a robustly optimal policy commitment in the context of our microfounded model,
before log-linearizing those equations to provide a local linear approximation to the
solution to those equations; this is intended to guarantee that the linear approxima-
tions that are eventually relied upon to obtain our nal, practical characterizations
are invoked in an internally consistent manner.
The analysis in Woodford (2010) also optimizes over only a family of linear policy
rules of a particular restrictive form, namely ones involving an advance commitment
optimal policy is computed under the assumption that members of the public are concerned about
the robustness of their own decisions, and the policymaker correctly understands the way that this
distorts their actions (relative to what the policymaker believes would be optimal for them). Hansen
and Sargent (2012) consider a similar exercise.
6See section 5.4 for further discussion of the earlier paper.
7Benigno and Paciello (2010) criticize the analysis of Woodford (2010) on this ground. Tack Yun
has raised the same issue, in a discussion of Woodford (2010) at a conference at the Bank of Korea.
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to a particular ination target that depends solely on the history of exogenous dis-
turbances, assumed to be observed by the central bank. While restricting attention
to this particular class of rules is known not to matter in the case of an analysis of
optimal policy in the log-linear approximate model under rational expectations,8 it
is not obvious that there may not be advantages to alternative types of rules when
one allows for departures for rational expectations. For example, one might expect
it to be desirable for policy to respond to observed departures of public expectations
from those that the central bank regards as correct | something that has no advan-
tage under an REE analysis, since no such discrepancy can ever exist in an REE.
Here we consider robustly optimal policy choice from among a much more exibly
specied class of policies, including allowance for the possibility of explicit response
to measures or indicators of private-sector expectations. In fact | to the extent that
our criterion for robustness is simply one of ensuring that the highest possible lower
bound for welfare (across alternative \near-rational" beliefs) is achieved9 | we nd
that there is no benet from expanding the set of candidate policy commitments to
include ones that are explicitly dependent on private-sector expectations. But it is an
important advance of the current analysis that this can be shown rather than simply
being assumed.
In section 2, we explain our general approach to the characterization of robustly
optimal policy. In addition to introducing our proposed denition of \near-rational
expectations," this section explains in general terms how it is possible for us to charac-
terize robustly optimal policy without having to restrict the analysis to a parametric
family of candidate policy rules, as is done in Woodford (2010). Section 3 then sets out
the structure of the microfounded New Keynesian model, showing how the model's
exact structural relations are modied by the allowance for distorted private-sector
expectations. Section 4 begins the analysis of robustly optimal policy in the New
Keynesian model by characterizing an evolution of the economy that represents an
upper bound on what can possibly be achieved. Section 5 provides an approximate
analysis of the upper-bound dynamics by log-linearizing the exact conditions estab-
lished in section 4; section 6 then shows that (at least up to the linear approximation
8See, e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler(1999), or section 1 in Woodford (2011).
9In section 7.1 below, we discuss a stronger form of robustness that is more dicult to achieve,
and argue that robustness in this stronger sense would require a commitment to respond to fairly
direct measures of belief distortions.
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introduced in section 5) the upper-bound dynamics are attainable by a variety of
policies, and hence solve the robust policy problem stated earlier. Section 7 then
considers further extensions, including a stronger form of robustness and robustly
optimal policy when policy must be conducted subject to partial information on the
part of the central bank; section 8 concludes.
2 Robustly Optimal Policy: Preliminaries
Here we rst describe the general strategy of the approach that we use to characterize
robustly optimal policy. These general ideas are then applied to a specic New
Keynesian model in section 3.
2.1 The Robustly Optimal Policy Problem
Our general strategy for characterizing robustly optimal policy can be usefully ex-
plained in a fairly abstract setting, before turning to an application of the approach in
the context of a specic model. In particular, we wish to explain how it is possible to
characterize robustly optimal policy without restricting consideration to a particular
parametric family of policy rules, as is done in Woodford (2010).
Let us suppose in general terms that a policymaker cares about economic outcomes
that can be represented by some vector x of endogenous variables, the values of which
will depend both on policy and on private-sector belief distortions, with the latter
parameterized by some vector m.10 Among the determinants of x are a vector of
structural equations, that we write as
F (x;m) = 0: (1)
We assume that the equations (1) are insucient to completely determine the vector
x, under given belief distortions m, so that the policymaker has a non-trivial choice.
We further assume that in absence of any concern for possible belief distortions on
the part of the private sector, i.e., if it were possible to be condent that private-sector
beliefs would coincide with his own, the policymaker would wish to achieve as high a
value as possible of some objectiveW (x): In the application below, this objective will
10In section 2.3 we discuss a particular approach to the parameterization of belief distortions, but
our general remarks here do not rely on it.
6
correspond to the expected utility of the representative household. In the presence
of a concern for robustness, we instead assume, following Hansen and Sargent (2005)
and Woodford (2010), that alternative policies are evaluated according to the value
of
min
m2M
[W (x) + V (m)]; (2)
where the minimization is over the set of all possible belief distortions M ; V (m)  0
is a measure of the size of the belief distortions, equal to zero only in the case of
beliefs that agree precisely with those of the policymaker;  > 0 is a coecient that
indexes the policymaker's degree of concern about potential belief distortions; and
(2) is evaluated taking into account the way in which belief distortions aect the
determination of x. Here a small value of  implies a great degree of concern for
robustness, while a large value of  implies that only modest departures from model-
consistent expectations are considered plausible. In the limit as  !1, criterion (2)
reduces to W (x), and the rational expectations analysis is recovered.11
More specically, let us suppose that the policymaker must choose a policy com-
mitment c from some set C of feasible policy commitments. Our goal is to show
that we can obtain results about robustly optimal policy that do not depend on the
precise specication of the set C; for now, we assume that there exists such a set, but
we make no specic assumption about what its boundaries may be. We only make
two general assumptions about the nature of the set C. First, we assume that each
of the commitments in the set C can be dened independently of what the belief
distortions may be.12 And second, we shall require that for any c 2 C, there exists
an equilibrium outcome for any choice of m 2M .
We thus rule out policy commitments that would imply non-existence of equilib-
rium for some m 2 M , and thereby situations in which one might be tempted to
conclude that belief distortions must be of a particular type under a given policy
commitment, simply because no other beliefs would be consistent with existence of
11Adam (2004) shows that the modied objective function (2) assumed for the case with a concern
for robustness can be interpreted as inducing innite risk aversion over a subset of the possible belief
distortions. Again, the size of this subset depends inversely on the robustness parameter .
12As is made more specic in the application below, we specify policy commitments by equations
involving the endogenous and exogenous variables x, and not explicitly involving the belief distortions
m. But of course the endogenous variables referred to in the rule will typically also be linked by
structural equations that involve the belief distortions.
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equilibrium. Instead of assuming that private-sector beliefs will necessarily be con-
sistent with some equilibrium that allows the intended policy to be carried out, we
assume that it is the responsibility of the policymaker to choose a policy commitment
that can be executed (so that an equilibrium exists in which it is fullled), regardless
of the beliefs that turn out to be held by the private sector. Thus, if under certain
beliefs, the policy would have to be modied on ground of infeasibility, then a cred-
ible description of the policy commitment should specify that the outcome will be
dierent in the case of those beliefs.13
Note that the set C may involve many dierent types of policy commitments. For
example, it may include policy commitments that depend on the history of exogenous
shocks; commitments that depend on the history of endogenous variables, as is the
case with Taylor rules; and commitments regarding relationships between endogenous
variables, as is the case with so-called targeting rules. Also, the endogenous variables
in terms of which the policy commitment is expressed may include asset prices (futures
prices, forward prices, etc.) that are often treated by central banks as indicators of
private-sector expectations, as long as the requirement is satised that the policy
commitment must be consistent with belief distortions of an arbitrary form.
In order to dene the robustly optimal decision problem of the policymaker, we
further specify an outcome function that identies the equilibrium outcome x associ-
ated with a given policy commitment and a given belief distortion m.
Denition 1 The economic outcomes associated with belief distortions m and com-
mitments c are given by an outcome function
O :M  C ! X
with the property that for all m 2 M and c 2 C, the outcome O(m; c) and m jointly
constitute an equilibrium of the model. In particular, the outcome function must
satisfy
F (O(m; c);m) = 0
for all all m 2M and c 2 C.
13Alternatively, instead of ruling out commitments that give rise to non-existence of equilibrium
under some belief distortions, it is equivalent to allow for such commitments and to assign a value
of  1 to the policymaker's objective when an equilibrium does not exist.
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Here we have not been specic about what we mean by an \equilibrium," apart from
the fact that (1) must be satised. In the context of the specic model presented
in the next section, equilibrium has a precise meaning. For purposes of the present
discussion, it does not actually matter how we dene equilibrium; only the denition
of the outcome function matters for our subsequent discussion.14
Note also that we do not assume that there is necessarily a unique equilibrium
associated with each policy commitment c and belief distortion m. We simply sup-
pose that the policymaker's robust policy problem can be dened relative to some
assumption about which equilibrium should be selected in order to evaluate a given
policy. For example, consistent with the desire for robustness, one might specify
that the outcome function O(c;m) selects the worst of the equilibria, in the sense
of yielding the lowest value for W (x)) consistent with the pair (c;m): Our approach
to the characterization of robustly optimal policy, however, does not depend on such
a specication; it can also be used to determine the robustly optimal policy for a
policymaker who is willing to assume that the best equilibrium will occur, among
those consistent with the given belief distortion.
We are now in a position to dene the robustly optimal policy problem as the
choice of a policy commitment to solve
max
c2C
min
m2M
(m; c) (3)
where
(m; c)  W (O(m; c)) + V (m):
2.2 An Upper Bound on What Policy Can Robustly Achieve
We shall now determine an upper bound for the economic outcomes that robustly
optimal policy can achieve in the decision problem (3), that does not depend on the
choice of the set C of feasible commitments or the outcome function O(; ). We
proceed in three incremental steps.
First, we use the min-max inequality (see appendix A.1 for a proof) to obtain
max
c2C
min
m2M
(m; c)  min
m2M
max
c2C
(m; c): (4)
14If the set of equations (1) is not a complete set of requirements for x to be an equilibrium, this
only has the consequence that the upper-bound outcome dened below might not be a tight enough
upper bound; it does not aect the validity of the assertion that it provides an upper bound.
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This inequality captures the intuitively obvious fact that it is no disadvantage to be
the second mover in the \game".
Second, using the right-hand side in (4), we free the policymaker from the re-
striction to choose commitments from the strategy space C and from the restrictions
imposed by the outcome function O(; ). Instead, we allow the policymaker to choose
directly the preferred economic outcomes x consistent with an equilibrium. This
yields
min
m2M
max
c2C
(m; c)
 min
m2M
max
x2X
[W (x) + V (m)] (5)
s:t: : F (x;m) = 0;
where the constraint F (x;m) = 0 captures the restrictions required for x to be an
equilibrium.15
In a third step, we dene a Lagrangian optimization problem associated with
problem (5):
min
m2M
max
x2X
L(m;x; ); (6)
where L is the Lagrange function
L(m;x; )  W (x) + V (m) + F (x;m);
and  is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. We will now state conditions under which
the outcome of the Lagrangian problem (6) generates weakly higher utility to the
policymaker than problem (5). Under these conditions it will also be the case that
the solution of the Lagrangian problem represents an upper bound on what policy
can achieve in the robustly optimal policy problem (3).
Suppose we have found a point (m; x; ) and the Lagrange function has a saddle
at this point, i.e., satises
L(m; x; ) < L(m; x; ) 8x 6= x (7a)
L(m;x; ) > L(m; x; ) 8m 6= m (7b)
L(m; x; )  L(m; x; ) 8: (7c)
Appendix (A.1) then proves the following result:
15The constraint represents a restriction on the choice of the second mover, i.e., the policymaker
choosing x.
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Proposition 1 Suppose (m; x; ) satises the saddle point conditions (7) and let
(xR;mR) denote the solution of the robustly optimal policy problem (3), then (x;m)
is an equilibrium and
W (xR) + V (mR)  W (x) + V (m):
The solution to the Lagrangian optimization problem thus delivers an upper bound
on what policy can achieve in the robustly optimal policy problem, provided the
saddle-point conditions hold.
Assuming dierentiability, it follows from conditions (7a) and (7b) that the solu-
tion to the Lagrangian problem necessarily satises the rst order conditions
Wx(x
) + Fx(x;m) = 0 (8)
Vm(m
) + Fm(x;m) = 0: (9)
Moreover, condition (7c) holds if and only if
F (x;m) = 0: (10)
Conditions (8)-(10) represent necessary conditions that allow us to generate candidate
solutions for the Lagrangian optimization problem. If a candidate solution satises
(7a)-(7b), then Proposition 1 implies that one has found an upper bound to the value
of the robustly optimal policy problem (3).16 For simplicity we refer to the solution
of the Lagrangian problem as the \upper-bound solution" in the remainder of the
paper.
2.3 Distorted Private Sector Expectations
We next discuss our approach to the parameterization of belief distortions, and the
cost function V (m): At this point it becomes necessary to specify that our analysis
concerns dynamic models in which information is progressively revealed over time, at
a countably innite sequence of successive decision points.
Let (
;B;P) denote a standard probability space with 
 denoting the set of pos-
sible realizations of an exogenous stochastic disturbance process f0; 1; 2; :::g, B the
16Condition (7c) is implied by the necessary condition (10).
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 algebra of Borel subsets of 
; and P a probability measure assigning probabili-
ties to any set B 2 B. We consider a situation in which the policy analyst assigns
probabilities to events using the probability measure P but fears that the private
sector may make decisions on the basis of a potentially dierent probability measure
denoted by bP .
We let E denote the policy analyst's expectations induced by P and bE the cor-
responding private sector expectations associated with bP . A rst restriction on the
class of possible distorted measures that the policy analyst is assumed to consider
| part of what we mean by the restriction to \near-rational expectations" | is
the assumption that the distorted measure bP , when restricted to events over any
nite horizon, is absolutely continuous with respect to the correspondingly restricted
version of the policy analyst's measure P .
The Radon-Nikodym theorem then allows us to express the distorted private sector
expectations of some t+ j measurable random variable Xt+j as
bE[Xt+jjt] = E[Mt+jMt Xt+jjt]
for all j  0 where t denotes the partial history of exogenous disturbances up to pe-
riod t. The random variableMt+j is the Radon-Nikodym derivative, and completely
summarizes belief distortions.17 The variableMt+j is measurable with respect to the
history of shocks t+j, non-negative and is a martingale, i.e., satises
E[Mt+jj!t] =Mt
for all j  0. Dening
mt+1 =
Mt+1
Mt
one step ahead expectations based on the measure bP can be expressed as
bE[Xt+1jt] = E[mt+1Xt+1jt];
where mt+1 satises
E[mt+1jt] = 1 and mt+1  0: (11)
17See Hansen and Sargent (2005) for further discussion.
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This representation of the distorted beliefs of the private sector is useful in dening
a measure of the distance of the private-sector beliefs from those of the policy analyst.
As discussed in Hansen and Sargent (2005), the relative entropy
Rt = Et[mt+1 logmt+1]
is a measure of the distance of (one-period-ahead) private-sector beliefs from the
policymaker's beliefs with a number of appealing properties.
We wish to extend this measure of the size of belief distortions to an innite-
horizon economy with a stationary structure. In the kind of model with which we
are concerned, the policy objective in the absence of a concern for robustness is of
the form
W (x)  E0
" 1X
t=0
tU(xt)
#
; (12)
for some discount factor 0 <  < 1; where U() is a time-invariant function, and xt
is a vector describing the real allocation of resources in period t. Correspondingly,
we propose to measure the overall degree of distortion of private-sector beliefs by a
discounted criterion of the form
V (m)  E0
" 1X
t=0
t+1mt+1 logmt+1
#
; (13)
as in Woodford (2010). This is a discounted sum of the one-period-ahead distortion
measures fRtg: We assign relative weights to the one-period-ahead measures Rt for
dierent dates and dierent states of the world in this criterion that match those of
the other part of the policy objective (12). Use of this cost function implies that
the policymaker's degree of concern for robustness (relative to other stabilization
objectives) remains constant over time, regardless of past history.
Hansen and Sargent (2005) appear to use a dierent cost function, but this is
because they consider a problem in which a decisionmaker is concerned about the
possible inaccuracy of her own probability beliefs. In their problem, the decision-
maker's basic objective is of the form
WHS(x)  bE0 " 1X
t=0
tU(xt)
#
; (14)
instead of (12), as she wishes to maximize expected utility under the correct prob-
abilities, which may be dierent from those implied by her baseline model. They
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correspondingly dene a discounted measure of belief distortions
V HS(m)  bE0 " 1X
t=0
t+1mt+1 logmt+1
#
= E0
" 1X
t=0
t+1Mt+1 logmt+1
#
(15)
instead of (13). As in their analysis, our worst-case belief distortions minimize a
discounted sum of terms of the form U(xt) + Rt; with a relative weight  that
is time-invariant.18 This allows us to obtain a characterization of robustly optimal
policy with a stationary form, which simplies the presentation of our results below.
It may be asked why we do not assume an objective of the form (14) in our
case, in which case it would also be appropriate to assume a cost function (15) for
belief distortions. This would imply a desire to maximize the expected utility of
the representative household as evaluated by that household when forecasting the
consequences of its actions, whether the policymaker agrees with those beliefs or not.
We instead assume a paternalistic objective: the policymaker wishes to maximize
people's true welfare, whether they understand it correctly or not.
There are arguments to be made for either objective in a normative analysis.
Here we focus on the paternalistic case, because our results are less trivial in that
case. The policymaker's problem in the non-paternalistic case would be equivalent
to the choice of a policy under the assumption that a rational-expectations equilib-
rium must result, but with uncertainty about the true probabilities of the stochastic
disturbances (assumed to be correctly understood by the private sector). Since the
rational-expectations analysis of Giannoni and Woodford (2010) has already shown
that there exists a form of policy commitment (commitment to an optimal target cri-
terion) that achieves a welfare-optimal equilibrium regardless of the stochastic process
assumed for the exogenous disturbances, this would also be a robustly optimal pol-
icy commitment under the non-paternalistic objective. The case considered here is
instead more complex.19
We now apply these results to a specic New Keynesian DSGE model of the
options for monetary stabilization policy.
18The point of the discount factor in (15) is clearly to make this relative weight time-invariant.
19See Hansen and Sargent (2011) for additional discussion of alternative possible robustly optimal
policy problems in the context of a dynamic New Keynesian model.
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3 A New Keynesian Model with Distorted Private
Sector Expectations
We shall begin by deriving the exact structural relations of a New Keynesian model
that is completely standard, except that the private sector holds potentially distorted
expectations. The exposition here follows and extends Woodford (2011), who writes
the exact structural relations in a recursive form for the case with model-consistent
expectations.
3.1 Private Sector
The economy is made up of identical innite-lived households, each of which seeks to
maximize
U  bE0 1X
t=0
t

~u(Ct; t) 
Z 1
0
~v(Ht(j); t)dj

; (16)
subject to a sequence of ow budget constraints20
PtCt +Bt 
Z 1
0
wt(j)PtHt(j)dj +Bt 1(1 + it 1) + t + Tt;
where bE0 is the common distorted expectations held by consumers conditional on
the state of the world in period t0, Ct an aggregate consumption good which can be
bought at nominal price Pt; Ht(j) is the quantity supplied of labor of type j and
!t(j) the associated real wage, Bt nominal bond holdings, it the nominal interest
rate, and t is a vector of exogenous disturbances, which may include random shifts
of either of the functions ~u or ~v. The variable Tt denotes lump sum taxes levied by
the government and t prots accruing to households from the ownership of rms.
The aggregate consumption good is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of
each of a continuum of dierentiated goods,
Ct 
Z 1
0
ct(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
; (17)
20We abstract from state contingent assets in the household budget constraint because the rep-
resentative agent assumption implies that in equilibrium there will be no trade in these assets. We
consider the prices of state contingent assets in section 7.2 below.
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with an elasticity of substitution equal to  > 1. Each dierentiated good is supplied
by a single monopolistically competitive producer. There are assumed to be many
goods in each of an innite number of \industries"; the goods in each industry j are
produced using a type of labor that is specic to that industry, and suppliers in the
same industry also change their prices at the same time, but are subject to frictions
in price adjustment as described below.21 The representative household supplies all
types of labor as well as consuming all types of goods. To simplify the algebraic form
of the results, it is convenient to assume isoelastic functional forms
~u(Ct; t) 
C1 ~
 1
t
C ~
 1
t
1  ~ 1 ; (18)
~v(Ht; t) 

1 + 
H1+t
H t ; (19)
where ~;  > 0; and f Ct; Htg are bounded exogenous disturbance processes which are
both among the exogenous disturbances included in the vector t:
There is a common technology for the production of all goods, in which (industry-
specic) labor is the only variable input,
yt(i) = Atf(ht(i)) = Atht(i)
1=; (20)
where At is an exogenously varying technology factor, and  > 1. The Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences (17) imply that the quantity demanded of each individual good i will
equal22
yt(i) = Yt

pt(i)
Pt
 
; (21)
where Yt is the total demand for the composite good dened in (17), pt(i) is the
(money) price of the individual good, and Pt is the price index,
Pt 
Z 1
0
pt(i)
1 di
 1
1 
; (22)
21The assumption of segmented factor markets for dierent \industries" is inessential to the results
obtained here, but allows a numerical calibration of the model that implies a speed of adjustment
of the general price level more in line with aggregate time series evidence. For further discussion,
see chapter 3 in Woodford (2003).
22In addition to assuming that household utility depends only on the quantity obtained of Ct;
we assume that the government also cares only about the quantity obtained of the composite good
dened by (17), and that it seeks to obtain this good through a minimum-cost combination of
purchases of individual goods.
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corresponding to the minimum cost for which a unit of the composite good can be
purchased in period t. Total demand is given by
Yt = Ct + gtYt; (23)
where gt is the share of the total amount of composite good purchased by the gov-
ernment, treated here as an exogenous disturbance process.
3.2 Government Sector
We assume that the central bank can control the riskless short-term nominal interest
rate it,
23 and that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates never binds.24 We
equally assume that the scal authority ensures intertemporal government solvency
regardless of what monetary policy may be chosen by the monetary authority. This
allows us to abstract from the scal consequences of alternative monetary policies
and to ignore the bond versus lump sum tax nancing decision of the scal authority
in our consideration of optimal monetary policy, as is implicitly done in Clarida et
al.(1999), and much of the literature on monetary policy rules. Finally, we assume
that the scal authority implements a bounded path for the real value of outstanding
government debt, so that the transversality conditions associated with optimal private
sector behavior are automatically satised.
3.3 Household Optimality Conditions
Each household maximizes utility by choosing state contingent sequences fCt; Ht(j); Btg
taking as given the process for fPt; wt(j); it;t; Ttg. The rst order conditions give
rise to an optimal labor supply relation
wt(j) =
~vh(Ht(j); t)
~uc(Ct; t)
; (24)
23This is possible even though we abstract from monetary frictions that would account for a
demand for central-bank liabilities that earn a substandard rate of return, as explained in chapter
2 in Woodford (2003).
24This can be shown to be true in the case of small enough disturbances, given that the nominal
interest rate is equal to r =  1   1 > 0 under the optimal policy in the absence of disturbances.
Consequences of a binding zero lower bound for the case with non-distorted private sector expecta-
tions are explored in Eggertson and Woodford (2003) and Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), for example.
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and a consumption Euler equation
~uC(Ct; t) =  bEt ~uC(Ct; t)1 + itt+1

; (25)
which characterize optimal household behavior.
3.4 Optimal Price Setting by Firms
The producers in each industry x the prices of their goods in monetary units for a
random interval of time, as in the model of staggered pricing introduced by Calvo
(1983) and Yun (1996). Let 0   < 1 be the fraction of prices that remain unchanged
in any period. A supplier that changes its price in period t chooses its new price pt(i)
to maximize bEt 1X
T=t
T tQt;T(pt(i); p
j
T ; PT ;YT ; T ); (26)
where bEt is the distorted expectations of price setters conditional on time t infor-
mation, which are assumed identical to the expectations held by consumers, Qt;T is
the stochastic discount factor by which nancial markets discount random nominal
income in period T to determine the nominal value of a claim to such income in
period t, and T t is the probability that a price chosen in period t will not have
been revised by period T . In equilibrium, this discount factor is given by
Qt;T = 
T t ~uc(CT ; T )
~uc(Ct; t)
Pt
PT
: (27)
Prots are equal to after-tax sales revenues net of the wage bill. Sales revenues are
determined by the demand function (21), so that (nominal) after-tax revenue equals
(1   t)pt(i)Yt

pt(i)
Pt
 
:
Here  t is a proportional tax on sales revenues in period t; f tg is treated as an
exogenous disturbance process, taken as given by the monetary policymaker. We
assume that  t uctuates over a small interval around a non-zero steady-state level  .
We allow for exogenous variations in the tax rate in order to include the possibility
of \pure cost-push shocks" that aect equilibrium pricing behavior while implying no
change in the ecient allocation of resources.
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The real wage demanded for labor of type j is given by equation (24) and rms are
assumed to be wage-takers. Substituting the assumed functional forms for preferences
and technology, the function
(p; pj; P ;Y; )  (1  )pY (p=P ) 
  P
 p
P
 pj
P
 
H 

Y
A
1+! 
(1  g)Y
C
1=~
(28)
then describes the after-tax nominal prots of a supplier with price p; in an industry
with common price pj; when the aggregate price index is equal to P and aggregate
demand is equal to Y . Here !  (1+) 1 > 0 is the elasticity of real marginal cost
in an industry with respect to industry output. The vector of exogenous disturbances
t now includes At; gt and  t, in addition to the preference shocks Ct and Ht.
Each of the suppliers that revise their prices in period t chooses the same new
price pt ; that maximizes (26). Note that supplier i's prots are a concave function of
the quantity sold yt(i); since revenues are proportional to yt(i)
 1
 and hence concave
in yt(i), while costs are convex in yt(i). Moreover, since yt(i) is proportional to
pt(i)
 ; the prot function is also concave in pt(i) . The rst-order condition for the
optimal choice of the price pt(i) is the same as the one with respect to pt(i)
 ; hence
the rst-order condition with respect to pt(i);
bEt 1X
T=t
T tQt;T1(pt(i); p
j
T ; PT ;YT ; T ) = 0;
is both necessary and sucient for an optimum. The equilibrium choice pt (which
is the same for each rm in industry j) is the solution to the equation obtained by
substituting pt(i) = p
j
t = p

t into the above rst-order condition.
Under the assumed isoelastic functional forms, the optimal choice has a closed-
form solution
pt
Pt
=

Kt
Ft
 1
1+!
; (29)
where Ft and Kt are functions of current aggregate output Yt, the current exogenous
state t; and the expected future evolution of ination, output, and disturbances,
dened by
Ft  bEt 1X
T=t
()T tf(YT ; T )

PT
Pt
 1
; (30)
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Kt  bEt 1X
T=t
()T tk(YT ; T )

PT
Pt
(1+!)
; (31)
where
f(Y ; )  (1  ) C ~ 1(Y (1  g)) ~ 1Y; (32)
k(Y ; )  
   1
1
A1+! H
Y 1+!: (33)
Relations (30){(31) can instead be written in the recursive form
Ft = f(Yt; t) +  bEt[ 1t+1Ft+1] (34)
Kt = k(Yt; t) +  bEt[(1+!)t+1 Kt+1]; (35)
where t  Pt=Pt 1:25
The price index then evolves according to a law of motion
Pt =

(1  )p1 t + P 1 t 1
 1
1  ; (36)
as a consequence of (22). Substitution of (29) into (36) implies that equilibrium
ination in any period is given by
1   1t
1   =

Ft
Kt
  1
1+!
: (37)
Equations (34), (35) and (37) jointly dene a short-run aggregate supply relation
between ination and output, given the current disturbances t; and expectations
regarding future ination, output, and disturbances.
3.5 Summary of the Model Equations and Equilibrium Def-
inition
For the subsequent analysis it will be helpful to express the model in terms of the
endogenous variables (Kt; Ft; Yt; it;t;mt) only, where mt is the belief distortions of
25It is evident that (30) implies (34); but one can also show that processes that satisfy (34) each
period, together with certain bounds, must satisfy (30). Since we are interested below only in the
characterization of bounded equilibria, we can omit the statement of the bounds that are implied by
the existence of well-behaved expressions on the right-hand sides of (30) and (31), and treat (34){
(35) as necessary and sucient for processes fFt;Ktg to measure the relevant marginal conditions
for optimal price-setting.
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the private sector and
t 
Z 1
0

pt(i)
Pt
 (1+!)
di  1 (38)
a measure of price dispersion at time t. The vector of exogenous disturbances is given
by t =
 
At; gt;  t; Ct; Ht
0
.
We begin by expressing expected household utility (evaluated under the objective
measure P) in terms of these variables. Inverting the production function (20) to
write the demand for each type of labor as a function of the quantities produced
of the various dierentiated goods, and using the identity (23) to substitute for Ct,
where gt is treated as exogenous, it is possible to write the utility of the representative
household as a function of the expected production plan fyt(i)g. One thereby obtains
U  E0
1X
t=0
t

u(Yt; t) 
Z 1
0
v(yjt ; t)dj

; (39)
where
u(Yt; t)  ~u(Yt(1  gt); t)
and
v(yjt ; t)  ~v(f 1(yjt=At); t):
In this last expression we make use of the fact that the quantity produced of each
good in industry j will be the same, and hence can be denoted yjt ; and that the
quantity of labor hired by each of these rms will also be the same, so that the total
demand for labor of type j is proportional to the demand of any one of these rms.
One can furthermore express the relative quantities demanded of the dierentiated
goods each period as a function of their relative prices, using (21). This allows us to
write the utility ow to the representative household in the form
U(Yt;t; t)  u(Yt; t)  v(Yt; t)t:
Hence we can express the household objective (39) as
U = E0
1X
t=0
tU(Yt;t; t): (40)
Here U(Y;; ) is a strictly concave function of Y for given  and , and a mono-
tonically decreasing function of  given Y and .
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Using this notation, the consumption Euler equation (25) can be expressed as
uY (Yt; t) = Et

mt+1uY (Yt+1; t+1)
1 + it
t+1
1  gt
1  gt+1

: (41)
Using (37) to substitute for the variable t equations (34) and (35) can be expressed
as
Ft = f(Yt; t) + Et [mt+1F (Kt+1; Ft+1)] (42)
Kt = k(Yt; t) + Et [mt+1K(Kt+1; Ft+1)] ; (43)
where the functions F ; K are both homogeneous degree 1 functions of K and F .
Because the relative prices of the industries that do not change their prices in
period t remain the same, one can use (36) to derive a law of motion for the price
dispersion term t of the form
t = h(t 1;t);
where
h(;)  (1+!) + (1  )

1   1
1  
 (1+!)
 1
:
This is the source of welfare losses from ination or deation. Using once more (37)
to substitute for the variable t one obtains
t = ~h(t 1; Kt=Ft): (44)
Equation (41)-(44) represent four constraints on the equilibrium paths of the six
endogenous variables (Yt; Ft; Kt;t; it;mt). For a given sequence of belief distortions
mt satisfying restriction (11) there is thus one degree of freedom left, which can be
determined by monetary policy. We are now in a position to dene the equilibrium
with distorted private sector expectations:
Denition 2 (DEE) A distorted expectations equilibrium (DEE) is a stochastic pro-
cess for fYt; Ft; Kt;t; it;mtg1t=0 satisfying equations (11) and (41)-(44).
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4 Upper Bound in the New Keynesian Model
We shall now formulate the Lagrangian optimization problem (6) for the nonlinear
New Keynesian model with distorted private sector expectations, and derive the non-
linear form of the necessary conditions (8)-(10).
The Lagrangian game (6) for the New Keynesian model is given by
min
fmt+1g1t=0
max
fYt;Ft;Kt;tg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t
266664
U(Yt;t; t) + mt+1 logmt+1
+t

~h(t 1; Kt=Ft) t

 0t[z(Yt; t) + mt+1(Zt+1)  Zt]
+ t (mt+1   1)
377775+  0 1(Z0); (45)
where t; t;  t denote Lagrange multipliers and we used the shorthand notation
Zt 
"
Ft
Kt
#
; z(Y ; ) 
"
f(Y ; )
k(Y ; )
#
; (Z) 
"
F (K;F )
K(K;F )
#
; (46)
and added the initial pre-commitment  0 1(Z0) to obtain a time-invariant solution.
The Lagrange multiplier vector  t is associated with constraints (42) and (43) and
given by  0t = ( 1t; 2;t). The multiplier t relates to equation (44) and the multiplier
 t to constraint (11). We also eliminated the interest rate and the constraint (41)
from the problem. Under the assumption that the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates is not binding, constraint (41) imposes no restrictions on the path of
the other variables. The path for the nominal interest rates can thus be computed
ex-post using the solution for the remaining variables and equation (41).
The nonlinear FOCs for the policymaker (8) are then given by
UY (Yt;t; t) +  
0
tzY (Yt; t) = 0 (47)
 t~h2(t 1; Kt=Ft)
Kt
F 2t
   1t + mt 0t 1D1(Kt=Ft) = 0 (48)
t
~h2(t 1; Kt=Ft)
1
Ft
   2t + mt 0t 1D2(Kt=Ft) = 0 (49)
U(Yt;t; t)  t + Et[t+1~h1(t; Kt+1=Ft+1)] = 0 (50)
for all t  0. The nonlinear FOC (9) dening the worst-case belief distortions takes
the form
(logmt + 1) +  
0
t 1(Zt) +  t 1 = 0 (51)
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for all t  1. Above, ~hi(; K=F ) denotes the partial derivative of ~h(; K=F ) with
respect to its i-th argument, and Di(K=F ) is the i-th column of the matrix
D(Z) 
"
@FF (Z) @KF (Z)
@FK(Z) @KK(Z)
#
: (52)
Since the elements of (Z) are homogeneous degree 1 functions of Z, the elements of
D(Z) are all homogenous degree 0 functions of Z, and hence functions of K=F only.
Thus we can alternatively write D(K=F ). Finally, the structural equations (10)
are given by equations (42)-(44). This completes the description of the necessary
conditions equations (8)-(10) for the New Keynesian model.
5 Locally Optimal Dynamics under the Upper Bound
Policy
We shall be concerned solely with optimal outcomes that involve small uctuations
around a deterministic optimal steady state. An optimal steady state is a set of
constant values ( Y ; Z; ; ;  ;  ; m) that solve the structural equations (42)-(44) and
the FOCs (47)-(51) in the case that t =  at all times and initial conditions consistent
with the steady state are assumed. We now compute the steady-state, then derive
the local dynamics implied by these FOCs and show that the saddle point conditions
(7) are locally satised.
5.1 Optimal Steady State
In a deterministic steady state, restriction (11) implies m = 1, so that the optimal
steady state is the same as derived in Benigno and Woodford (2005) for the case
with non-distorted private sector expectations. Specically, it satises F = K = (1 
) 1k( Y ; ), which implies  = 1 (no ination) and  = 1 (zero price dispersion),
and the value of Y is implicitly dened by
f( Y ; ) = k( Y ; ):
Because ~h2(1; 1) = 0 (the eects of a small non-zero ination rate on the measure of
price dispersion are of second order), conditions (48){(49) reduce in the steady state
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to the eigenvector condition
 0 =  0D(1): (53)
Moreover, since when evaluated at a point where F = K;
@ log(K=F )
@ logK
=  @ log(K=F )
@ logF
=
1

;
and we observe that D(1) has a left eigenvector [1   1]; with eigenvalue 1=; hence
(53) is satised if and only if  2 =   1: Condition (47) provides then one additional
condition to determine the magnitude of the elements of  1. It implies
UY (Y ; 1; ) +  1(fY ( Y ; )  kY ( Y ; )) = 0: (54)
Since ky   fy = ! + e 1 > 0 we have that
 1 > 0;
whenever UY > 0, i.e., whenever steady state output Y falls short of the rst best or
ecient steady state level Y
e
dened as
UY (Y
e
; 1; ) = 0:
In the limiting case Y ! Y e we have  1 = 0. Finally, condition (50) provides a
restriction allowing to determine the steady state value of  :
U(Y ; 1; )   + ~h1(1; 1) = 0:
Since U < 0 and ~h1(1; 1) = , we have
 =
U(Y ; 1; )
(1  ) < 0:
5.2 Optimal Dynamics
Let us dene the endogenous variables
t  log t
m^t  logmt
xt  Y^t   Y^ t ; (55)
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where xt denotes the `output gap' with bYt = log Yt= Y , bY t = log Y t = Y and Y t being
the `target level of output', which is a function of the exogenous disturbances only
and implicitly dened as
UY (Y

t ; 1; t) +  
0zY (Y t ; t) = 0: (56)
The following proposition characterizes the log-linear local approximation to the dy-
namics implied by the nonlinear structural equations (42)-(44) and the nonlinear
rst-order conditions (47)-(51):
Proposition 2 If initial price dispersion  1 is small (of order O(jjjj2)) and the
initial precommitments such that  1;0 =   2;0 > 0, then equations (42)-(44) and
(47)-(51) imply up to rst order that
t = xt + Ett+1 + ut (57)
0 = t + x(xt   xt 1) + mm^t (58)
m^t = m (t   Et 1[t]) : (59)
The constants ( > 0; ; m; x; m) are functions of the deep model parameters (ex-
plicit expressions are provided in Appendix A.2). In the empirically relevant case
in which steady state output falls short of its ecient level (Y < Y
e
) we have
 > 0; m > 0; m > 0; and if the steady-state output distortion is suciently small,
x > 0 as well.
The proof of the proposition is given in appendix A.2. The disturbance ut above
denotes a `cost-push' term and is dened as
ut  [Y^ t + u0~t]; (60)
where u is dened in equation (81) in Appendix A.2. It is straightforward to gener-
alize the above proposition to the case with larger degrees of initial price dispersion
( 1 of order O(jjjj)). As becomes clear from Appendix A.2, this would add addi-
tional deterministic dynamics to the optimal path. Also, in the case that the initial
precommitments fail to imply the condition stated in the proposition, the results of
the proposition would still become valid asymptotically, as the eects of the initial
conditions vanishes with time.
The following proposition shows that the economic outcomes characterized by
Proposition 2 indeed constitute a local solution to the upper-bound problem (5).
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Proposition 3 If steady state output falls short of its ecient level (Y < Y e) and the
steady state output distortions are suciently small, then the Lagrangian (45) locally
satises the saddle point properties (7a)-(7b) at the solution implied by equations
(57)-(59).
The proof of the proposition can be found in appendix A.2.
5.3 The Optimal Ination Response to Cost-Push Distur-
bances
In this section we derive a closed form solution for the optimal ination response to a
cost push disturbance, as implied by equations (57)-(59). For simplicity, we assume
that the evolution of the cost-push disturbances is described by
ut = ut 1 + !t; (61)
where  2 [0; 1) captures the persistence of the disturbance and !t is an iid innova-
tion. We then use the relationship (59) to substitute for m^t in (58), and equation
(57) to substitute for xt. This delivers a second order expectational dierence equa-
tion describing the worst-case ination evolution under a robustly optimal policy
commitment:
0 = t +
x

(t   Ett+1   ut   t 1 + Et 1t + ut 1)
+ mm (t   Et 1t) :
We now consider the impulse response dynamics to an unexpected cost push shock
!t0 in some period t0 that are implied by this equation. Because of the linearity of our
system, we can calculate the dynamic response to an individual shock independently
of any assumptions about the shocks that occur in other periods, so let us consider
the case in which no shocks have occurred in the past and none will occur in any
later periods either; in this case we need only solve for the perfect-foresight dynamics
after the occurrence of the one-time shock. We suppose, then, that we start from
the deterministic steady state, so that the initial conditions are given by t0 1 =
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Et0 1t0 = ut0 1 = 0. The previous equation then implies
0 = ( + mm +
x

)t0  
x

(t0+1 + ut0) ; (62)
0 = ( +
x(1 + )

)t   x

(t+1 + t 1 + ut   ut 1) for t > t0; (63)
where the second equation applies for all t > t0: (All variables in these equations refer
to the expected values of the variables after the shock is realized in period t0.)
The eigenvalues of the characteristic equation imply that equation (63) has a
unique non-explosive solution for t (t > t0) for a given initial value t0 and a given
bounded exogenous sequence for ut. In the case that (as implied by (61)) ut+j = 
jut
for all j  0, so that at each date ut is a sucient statistic for the entire anticipated
future evolution of the disturbance term, this solution takes the simple form
t = at 1 + but 1; (64)
where 0 < a < 1 is the smaller of the two real roots of
2   (1 +  + =x)+ 1 = 0;
and
b =  (1  )a < 0:
Note that the coecients a and b are independent of the policymaker's concern for
robustness . Thus the optimal dynamics for t > t0 depend in the same way on
the lagged ination rate and the path of the exogenous disturbance as in a pure RE
analysis of the model. The result is dierent, though, for the initial period t0 when
ination jumps unexpectedly in response to the shock.
Combining equation (62) with equation (64) for t = t0 + 1 delivers a solution of
the form t0 = b0ut0 for the initial impact of the shock, where
b0  b+ 
 1

x
 
 + mm +
x

  a:
Note that the numerator and denominator of this fraction are both positive for all
mm  0, so that b0 > 0: With robustness concerns we have mm > 0, so that the
optimal immediate impact eect of the shock on ination is smaller than under the
RE analysis. And in the limiting case where robustness concerns increase without
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bound ( ! 0), we have mm ! 1, so that it becomes optimal to prevent any
unexpected jump in ination at all in response to a shock. (Under an optimal policy,
ination will be completely forecastable one period in advance.)
It follows that the cumulative price level response to a shock is given by
1X
t=t0
t =
b0ut0
1  a +
1X
t=t0+1
but
1  a =

b0 +


1  

b

ut0
1  a:
In the absence of robustness concerns, this implies that
P1
t=0 t = 0, so that cost-push
shocks have no eect on the long-run price level under an optimal commitment. (This
results in the familiar conclusion from the RE literature that price-level targeting
is optimal.) Since a and b are independent of robustness concerns, but the initial
response b0 is dampened under robustness concerns, the term in square brackets is
negative when robustness is taken into account. Hence robustness concerns make
it optimal to plan to decrease (increase) the price level in the long run following a
positive (negative) cost-push shock.
Because of certainty-equivalence, the above results translate directly to the case
with a random shock each period, as specied in (61). Under the upper-bound dy-
namics, in any period t0; the conditional expectation Et0t (for any t  t0) depends
linearly on ut0 through precisely the coecient obtained in the perfect-foresight cal-
culation, so that the sequence of coecients describes the impulse response function
of ination to a cost-push shock. The law of motion for ination in the general case
is given by
t = Et 1t + (t   Et 1t)
= (at 1 + but 1) + b0(ut   ut 1
= at 1 + b0ut + b1ut 1; (65)
where b1  b b0 < 0: Thus ination evolves according to the stationary ARMA(2,1)
process
(1  aL)(1  L)t = b0!t + b1!t 1:
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5.4 Comparison with Results in Woodford (2010)
As noted in the introduction, Woodford (2010) considers a similar problem, but
assuming a quadratic loss function
minE0
1X
t=t0
t[2t + (xt   x)2] (66)
with coecients ; x > 0 for the policy objective, and a New Keynesian Phillips
curve that depends on subjective private-sector expectations,
t = xt + E^tt+1 + ut: (67)
The structural relation (67) is assumed to be linear in the (potentially) distorted
expectations, but when written in terms of the policymaker's expectation operator,
t = xt + Et[mt+1t+1] + ut; (68)
the structural relation includes a quadratic term.
It is known from the results in Benigno and Woodford (2005) that the charac-
terization of the optimal policy commitment obtained from such a linear-quadratic
analysis coincides with the linear approximation to the dynamics under an optimal
policy commitment that can be derived (as in the present paper) by log-linearizing
the exact equations that characterize an optimal commitment in a microfounded New
Keynesian model.26 Here we comment on the extent to which a similar justication
for the linear-quadratic analysis is valid when policy is required to be robust to de-
partures from model-consistent expectations.
In Woodford (2010), worst-case dynamics under the robustly optimal policy com-
mitment are described by linear equations, as they are here, but the linearity is
obtained not from a local linear approximation to the exact optimal dynamics, but
rather as a consequence of only optimizing over a class of linear policy rules. The
analysis in Woodford (2010) therefore leaves open the question of the extent to which
nonlinear policy rules could improve upon the constrained-optimal policy character-
ized in that paper, while our present analysis leaves open the question of the extent to
which the optimal policy commitment should be dierent in the case of larger shocks
than those assumed in our local analysis. Hence we should not expect the results of
26See Woodford (2011), section 2, for further discussion of the relation between the two approaches.
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the two analyses to coincide, except in the case to which both are intended to give
a solution, which is the case of small enough shocks for terms other than those of
rst order in the amplitude of the shocks to be neglected.27 Woodford (2010) also
presents an explicit solution for the dynamics under robustly optimal policy only in
the case of i.i.d. cost-push disturbances, corresponding to the special case  = 0 of
the process (61) considered in the previous section.
We can, however, compare the results obtained here to those obtained in Woodford
(2010) for the case  = 0 in the small-shock limit (i.e., the limiting values of the
coecients that describe the robustly optimal dynamics as u ! 0). In that limiting
case, the results presented in (2010) coincide with those derived here, with a suitable
interpretation of the coecients ; x of the policy objective (66) in terms of the
parameters of our microfounded model.
In Woodford (2010), as here, the dynamics of ination under the robustly optimal
policy commitment28 are given by a law of motion of the form (65); in the earlier
paper, the coecient a is referred to as , the coecient b0 is referred to as p1=u,
and the coecient b1 (which is equal to  a in the case that  = 0) is written as  .
The characteristic equation dening a in the present solution is furthermore seen to
coincide with the quadratic equation dening  in Woodford (2010) if the coecient
 in that paper is dened as
  x

in terms of our current notation.29 Moreover, the nonlinear equation that implicitly
denes p1 in Woodford (2010) implies that p1 ! 0 as u ! 0; but that the ratio p1=u
converges to a non-zero limit. That limiting value is given by an equation identical
27In fact, the results obviously do not coincide more generally, since the coecients of the robustly
optimal linear dynamics derived in Woodford (2010) are functions of the parameter u, indicating
the standard deviation of the \cost-push shocks," whereas they are independent of all shock variances
in the local linear approximation calculated in this paper.
28Under the kind of policy assumed in Woodford (2010), the dynamics of ination are determined
solely by the policy commitment and are independent of private-sector belief distortions. As dis-
cussed in the next section, this is also one possible way of implementing the upper-bound dynamics
in our model as well, though not the only one.
29Note that as long as steady-state distortions are not too large, the value of  implied by this
formula is positive, as assumed in the earlier paper.
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to the one given above for b0, if x
 is the positive quantity30 such that


x
2
=
m

m > 0:
Hence with these identications of the parameter values, the linear dynamics for
ination derived in Woodford (2010) are identical to those obtained here as a linear
approximation to the upper-bound dynamics.
A local linear approximation to the implied dynamics of the output gap under the
robustly optimal policy commitment can be derived from the dynamics of ination,
by substituting the predicted evolution of ination into the aggregate-supply relation
and solving for the implied path of the output gap. In the method employed here,
the solution (65) for ination is substituted into the linearized structural relation
(57), whereas in Woodford (2010) the path of ination is substituted into the relation
(68), which involves the expectation distortion factor. It might seem, then, that
our current method should not predict the same upper-bound dynamics of output,
even if the dynamics of ination are the same; indeed, in the earlier paper it was
shown that under the kind of linear policy rule that is considered there, the implied
uctuations in the output gap are amplied (divided by a constant factor  < 1) as
a result of the worst-case belief distortions, relative to the prediction of the log-linear
New Keynesian Phillips curve in the absence of distorted beliefs. But in the limit as
u ! 0; the optimal value of the coecient p1 ! 0; as just noted, and this implies
that  ! 1: Hence in the small-noise linear approximation, the predicted output
dynamics are the same using both methods. This is just what one should expect,
given that in the small-noise linear approximation,
Et[mt+1t+1] = Et ~mt+1 + Ett+1 = Ett+1;
so that (57) and (68) are equivalent, to that order of approximation.
Hence the problem considered in Woodford (2010) has the same solution as the
robustly optimal dynamics of our microfounded model, up to a linear approximation
of these respective characterizations in the limiting case of small-enough exogenous
disturbances. We have no reason, however, to expect that the characterization in
Woodford (2010) of the way in which robustly optimal policy changes as u is in-
creased should also be correct for the microfounded model. There is no reason to
30Here we assume, as in our discussion above, that steady-state output is ineciently low, so that
 1 > 0:
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expect even that the calculations in the earlier paper describe robustly optimal policy
within the class of linear policy rules; for in this sort of calculation for the large-shock
case, nonlinearities of the various structural equations become relevant, and we have
no reason to suppose that the particular nonlinearity that is considered in Woodford
(2010) | the eect of the distorted expectations in (68) | is the only that is quanti-
tatively signicant. But we leave the quantitative investigation of this issue for future
work.
6 Implementing the Upper Bound
We now study whether a monetary policymaker can achieve the upper-bound solu-
tion characterized in the previous section, so that it represents the solution to the
robustly optimal monetary policy problem (3). Since we have only characterized the
upper-bound dynamics to a linear approximation, we similarly only show that certain
policies result in dynamics that coincide with the upper-bound dynamics in this local
linear approximation. We do show that local implementation is feasible, and present
a variety of policy commitments, each of which would suce for this purpose.
The result that we rely upon applies to policy commitments of the following form.
Assumption 1 Under policy commitment c, the policymaker commits to ensure that
some relationship ct() = 0 holds every period, where for each t, ct() is a function of
the paths of the variables f ; Y ; i ; g for   t; and there exists some neighborhood
of the steady-state values of these variables such that the functions ct() are all dened
and twice continuously dierentiable for all paths that remain forever within that
neighborhood.
We shall furthermore seek a robustly optimal member of a class of rules of the fol-
lowing form.
Denition 3 In the case of any neighborhood N of the steady-state values of the
endogenous variables (t; Yt; it); any bound jjjj > 0 on the amplitude of the exogenous
disturbances; and any class M of belief distortions, including all processes fmt+1g in
which mt+1 remains forever within a certain neighborhood of 1; we dene the class C
of policy commitments as the set of all commitments c such that
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1. Assumption 1 is satised, in the case of exogenous disturbances satisfying the
bound jjjj and paths of the endogenous variables remaining forever within neigh-
borhood N ; and
2. for any belief distortions in the class M, and any disturbance process satisfying
the bound jjjj, there exists at least one DEE in which the endogenous variables
remain forever in the neighborhood N .
Suppose furthermore that there exists a policy commitment with the following
additional properties.
Assumption 2 The policy commitment c is consistent with the steady state in the
case that all disturbance processes are at all times equal to their steady-state values.
Moreover, a log-linear approximation of the sequence of policy commitments around
the steady state is such that
1. the linearized policy commitments are consistent with the log-linear approxima-
tion to the upper-bound solution (dened by equations (57)-(59)),and
2. the linearized policy commitments imply a locally determinate equilibrium under
rational expectations (i.e., there exist a bound on the amplitude of the exogenous
disturbances and a neighborhood of the steady-state values of the endogenous
variables, such that for any disturbance process satisfying the bound there ex-
ists a unique REE in which the endogenous variables remain always within the
neighborhood).
If there exists a policy commitment c satisfying these assumptions, then we can
show that, up to a log-linear approximation, c represents a robustly optimal policy
commitment that implements the upper-bound solution dened above.
More precisely, our key result can be stated as follows.
Proposition 4 Suppose there exists a policy commitment c that satises Assump-
tions 1 and 2. Then it is possible to dene the bound jjjj > 0; the neighborhood N ;
the class of belief distortions M; and a particular policy commitment c 2 C, where C
is the class of rules specied in Denition (3), under which the policymaker commits
to ensure that certain relations ct () = 0 hold for all t; such that
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1. for each t, the function ct () is equal to the function ct(); to a log-linear ap-
proximation (i.e., , the log-linearizations of policies c and c are identical);
2. in the case of any disturbance process satisfying the bound, and any outcome
function O(m; c), dened for all belief distortions m 2M and all policy commit-
ments c 2 C, and associating to any pair (m; c) a DEE in which the endogenous
variables remain forever in the neighborhood N , the policy commitment c solves
the robustly optimal policy problem
max
c2C
min
m2M
W (O(m; c)) + V (m); (69)
and
3. the belief distortions m that solve the inner problem in (69) are identical to
the worst-case belief distortions m associated with the upper-bound solution;
and the dynamics of the endogenous variables given by the outcome function
O(m; c) are identical to the dynamics under the upper-bound solution.
Hence by choosing a policy commitment that (to a log-linear approximation) cor-
responds to a policy c that satises the conditions stated in the proposition, monetary
policy can implement the upper-bound outcome regardless of the assumed outcome
function O(; ), as long as the outcome function selects only equilibria in the neigh-
borhood of the optimal steady state. The proof of Proposition 4 is given in Appendix
A.3.
Note that our assumption that the policy commitment c (and hence similarly
the robustly optimal policy commitment c) is expressed by a sequence of backward-
looking functions of the path of the particular variables mentioned in Assumption
1 is not intended to imply that this is the only coherent formulation of a policy
commitment, nor that only rules of this form can possibly be robustly optimal policies.
We simply have established that it is not necessary for the policy commitment to be
of some more complex form | for example, it is not necessary either for the policy
commitment to refer explicitly to the evolution of the belief distortions fmt+1g or
to private-sector forecasts of any variables | in order for a robustly optimal policy
commitment to exist. In fact, we show below that there are several ways in which
once can nd robustly optimal policy commitments that have the form assumed in
the proposition. Commitments from this simple class have the advantage that the
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policymaker does not have to commit to a specic empirical measure of private-sector
belief distortions when stating its policy commitment.
The corollaries below present a number of specic policy commitments that satisfy
the conditions stated in Proposition 4. Among other things, these examples verify
that there do exist policy rules satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 If monetary policy commits to implement the state-contingent ination
sequence of the upper-bound solution (as implied by the solution to equations (57)-
(59)), then the upper bound is the locally unique outcome of the robust monetary
policy problem (69).
For the commitment considered in the previous corollary, condition 1 of Assumption
2 holds by assumption; and as is easily shown, the commitment also implies a locally
determinate outcome under rational expectations, so that the second condition of
Assumption 2 holds as well.
The following result shows that monetary policy can alternatively implement the
upper bound outcome by committing to a Taylor rule.31
Corollary 2 Suppose monetary policy commits to follow a Taylor rule of the form
1 + it = (1 + i

t )

t
t
  Yt
Y t
Y
; (70)
where (it ;

t ; Y

t ) denotes the evolution of the interest rate, ination and output in
the upper-bound solution. If the coecients (; Y ) satisfy the local determinacy
conditions under private-sector rational expectations, then the upper-bound solution
is the locally unique outcome of the robust monetary policy problem (69).
Finally, monetary policy could implement the upper-bound outcome instead by
committing to a targeting rule. In this case somewhat more stringent conditions
apply.
Corollary 3 Suppose steady-state output falls short of its ecient level (Y < Y e),
and the steady state output distortions are suciently small. If monetary policy
commits to insure that the target criterion
t + x(xt   xt 1) + mm (t   Et 1[t]) = 0 (71)
31Note that conditions 1 and 2 of Assumption 2 are guaranteed to hold by the hypotheses of
corollary 2.
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holds each period, then the upper-bound solution is the locally unique outcome of the
robust monetary policy problem (69).
Condition 1 of Assumption 2 holds because the targeting rule (71) is implied by
the log-linearized upper-bound dynamics (58) and (59). Appendix A.3 shows that
condition 2 of Assumption 2 also holds, provided that the additional conditions stated
in the corollary are satised.
To sum up, this section has shown that monetary policy can implement the upper-
bound solution as the locally unique outcome of the robustly optimal policy problem
by making an appropriate policy commitment. Importantly, the required policy com-
mitments do not need to make explicit reference to private-sector belief distortions,
and thus are not fundamentally more dicult to explain to the public than policy
commitments that would be desirable under the assumption of private-sector rational
expectations.
7 Extensions of the Basic Analysis
Here we address two possible extensions of the analysis above. The rst considers a
possible strengthening of our denition of robustly optimal policy, under which the
policies just described would no longer suce. The second considers the consequences
of additional restrictions on the class of feasible policies, as a result of which the
policies just described would not necessarily be available.
7.1 Maximally Robust Optimal Policy
The previous sections were concerned with monetary policy rules that implement the
best possible level of policymaker objective under worst-case private sector beliefs.
We now ask whether one can nd monetary policy rules that improve robustness in
the sense that they perform better than the robust policy considered thus far in the
case of some possible private sector beliefs other than the worst-case beliefs,32 while
32For example, Benigno and Paciello (2010) hypothesize a particular kind of private-sector belief
distortions, resulting from a concern for robustness on the part of the public, and suppose that the
policymaker should be able to predict this kind of concern on the part of the public. The maximally
robust optimal policy characterized in this section would also represent an optimal policy under that
hypothesis.
37
doing equally well in the case of the worst-case beliefs.
The best that monetary policy can do in response to general belief distortions is
to bring about the highest-welfare equilibrium consistent with the given belief distor-
tions, regardless of what those belief distortions may be. This is the outcome that
would result if, purely hypothetically, the private sector had to commit to particular
belief distortions before the policymaker's choice of its policy commitment, and the
policymaker could observe those distortions before making its decision. Again, this
denes a problem that can be formulated and solved without reference to any par-
ticular class of policy commitments | it is simply necessary to optimize over the set
of paths for the endogenous variables that constitute a DEE under the given belief
distortions | and again this provides an upper bound for what can conceivably be
achieved by any policy. If a policy commitment can then be found that achieves this
upper bound, it would necessarily be a maximally robust optimal policy.
Under the present, stronger criterion for robustness, it is less obvious that we
should expect that the upper bound can be attained; certainly a much more complex
type of policy commitment will have to be contemplated if this is to be possible.
Nonetheless, here we restrict our discussion to a derivation of the state-contingent
evolution corresponding to this upper bound. The following proposition locally char-
acterizes the best response dynamics for output and ination for a general belief
distortion process:33
Proposition 5 If initial price dispersion  1 is small (of order O(jjjj2)) and the
initial precommitments such that  1;0 =   2;0 > 0, then equations (42)-(44) and (47)-
(51) imply up to rst order that the best response dynamics of output and ination
for any given process of belief distortions satisfy
t = xt + Ett+1 + ut (72)
0 = t + x(xt   xt 1) + mm^t; (73)
where again m^t  logmt; and the constants ( > 0; ; m; x; m) satisfy the condi-
tions stated in Proposition 2.
For the particular case that private sector belief distortions are given by worst-
case belief distortions, the previous result reduces to the one given in Proposition 2.
33The proof of Proposition 5 follows directly from the steps of the proof of Proposition 2 up to
equation (91).
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For a general process of belief distortions and if the evolution of mark-up shocks is of
the autoregressive form (61), Proposition 5 implies that the best response dynamics
are given (to rst order) by the following recursion
 
xt
t
!
=
 
e2
x(1 e2)

!
xt 1 +
 
  
x(e1 )
1
(e1 )
!
ut +
 
 1 m
e1x
1 e1
e1
m

!
m^t; (74)
where e1 > 
 1 and e2 2 (0; 1). This is shown in Appendix A.4. Since e1 > 1,
the best response dynamics imply that monetary policy optimally reduces ination
in states to which private agents assign higher than objective likelihood (m^t > 0) and
increases it in states whose likelihood private agents underpredict (m^t < 0).
We also have the following result, which is proven in Appendix A.4:
Proposition 6 Suppose that monetary policy commits to implement the state-contingent
best-response dynamics for ination, dened in (74). Then the worst-case belief dis-
tortions are the distortions m dened in our derivation of the upper-bound dynamics,
and the associated worst-case value of the augmented objective (2) is the same as un-
der the upper-bound solution.
This shows that committing to the best-response dynamics for ination, instead of
to the upper-bound process for ination, as a monetary policy commitment comes
at no cost, if the criterion used to evaluate alternative policy commitments is simply
the value of the augmented objective under worst-case beliefs. However, under other
types of belief distortions than the ones that would be worst for the policymaker, the
best-response commitment will in general deliver a higher value for the policymaker's
objective than that guaranteed by the upper-bound dynamics for ination. Hence the
fact that a policy commitment is robustly optimal in the weaker sense dened earlier
does not imply that it cannot be dominated by other types of policy commitments.
The example of a maximally robust policy commitment just given requires the
policy commitment to make explicit reference to the magnitude of private-sector belief
distortions. While we have no proof, it seems likely that a strongly robust policy must
necessarily refer to a larger set of state variables than the ones allowed by the class
C of policy commitments dened earlier.
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7.2 Implications of Central Bank Information Constraints
In the previous sections we assumed that the policymaker has perfect information
about the state of the economy at time t. One implication of this - clearly unrealis-
tic - assumption is that monetary policy can contemporaneously and costlessly undo
any distortion in private sector output expectations by appropriately adjusting the
nominal interest rate.34 As a result, someone seeking to choose the private-sector be-
lief distortions that will most embarrass the policymaker has no incentives to distort
output expectations, and focuses instead on distorting ination expectations. One
may wonder whether this exclusive concern with distorted ination expectations in
the worst-case scenario is itself robust to assuming a more realistic information set
for the monetary policymaker. If monetary policy cannot react contemporaneously
to distortions in output expectations, because of information lags for example, then
perhaps the worst-case belief distortions should also distort expectations about states
in which there are unexpected movements in output. This would in turn provide in-
centives for the policymaker to stabilize output movements, thereby potentially over-
turning our previous results, which require policy to dampen unexpected movements
in ination.
In order to investigate this possibility, we consider now a setting where at time
t the policymaker has only information available up to time t   1, and study the
resulting upper bound outcome under this information setting. As we show below,
our baseline results turn out to be robust. Worst case belief distortions continue to be
associated - to a rst order approximation - exclusively with unexpected movements
in ination.
Under the assumed lagged information set, the Lagrangian game determining the
34This assumes that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is not binding.
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upper bound outcome is given by
min
fmt+1g1t=0
max
fYt;Ft;Kt;t;itg1t=0
(75)
E0
1X
t=0
t
266666664
U(Yt;t; t) + mt+1 logmt+1
+t

~h(t 1; Kt=Ft) t

 0t[z(Yt; t) + mt+1(Zt+1)  Zt]
+ t (mt+1   1)
+
t

uY (Yt; t)  mt+1uY (Yt+1; t+1)1+it 1t+1
1+gt
1+gt+1

377777775
+  0 1(Z0) + 
 1uY (Y0; 0)
1 + i 2
0
1 + g 1
1 + g0
;
where unlike in problem (45) we can no longer drop the constraint (41), because the
interest rate now has to be determined based on one period lagged information.35
We also added the last term, which is an initial commitment useful for obtaining a
time-invariant solution.
The following proposition summarizes the main nding:
Proposition 7 Suppose in period t the policymaker has access to information up to
period t   1 only. The worst case belief distortions associated with the upper bound
outcome then continues to be given up to rst order by equation (59).
The proof of the proposition can be found in appendix A.5. It shows that the
eects of unexpected movements in output have at most second order eects on
the worst case belief distortions. This nding is ultimately due to the fact that
the Lagrange multiplier 
t associated with constraint (41) is zero in steady state,
which results from the fact that the deterministic steady-state information set of the
policymaker is unbiased.
8 Conclusions
We have shown how it is possible to analyze optimal monetary stabilization policy,
taking into account the possibility that private-sector expectations may not be pre-
cisely model-consistent. Our approach shows how one can choose a policy that is
35The timing convention is that it denotes the interest rate between period t + 1 and t + 2, as
chosen in period t.
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intended to be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs close enough to model-
consistency. Moreover, we have shown how to characterize robustly optimal policy
without restricting consideration a priori to a particular parametric family of candi-
date policy rules.
One of our key goals in this reconsideration of the results of Woodford (2010)
has been to consider whether policy rules that allow direct dependence of the central
bank's policy targets on measures of private-sector expectations may have superior
robustness properties relative to policy rules of the kind shown to be optimal in the
literature that assumes rational-expectations equilibrium. We have found that even
if we were to consider rules involving arbitrary dependence of that kind on private-
sector forecasts, it would not be possible to choose a policy commitment that could
ensure a higher lower bound for welfare (across the set of belief distortions that satisfy
our criterion for \near-rationality") than the one that can be achieved by a policy of
the kind considered by Woodford (2010), in which the central bank's state-contingent
ination target is expressed as a function of the history of exogenous disturbances.
Among the policy commitments that we have shown should suce to achieve this
greatest lower bound is a commitment to a particular target criterion, that maintains
a linear relationship between the paths of ination and of a suitably dened output
gap. This particular characterization of the robustly optimal policy commitment
has the advantage that it can be stated without any reference to any exogenous
disturbances, and the coecients of the optimal target criterion are independent (in
the linear approximation used here) of all parameters describing the properties of the
exogenous disturbance processes as well, just as in the optimal target criteria derived
by Giannoni and Woodford (2010) under the assumption of rational expectations.
The form of the optimal target criterion is similar to the one derived by Giannoni
and Woodford in the RE case, except that it no longer refers solely to variations
in ination, regardless of the extent to which these may be anticipated in advance.
Instead, under the robustly optimal target criterion, \objective" ination surprises
(by which we mean the component of ination that is understood by the policy analyst
to dier from what should have been predicted the period before) receive a greater
weight | and so require a greater output reduction in order to be justiable | than
do variations in ination that are predicted in advance by the central bank. As a
consequence, shocks will not be allowed to cause unexpected movements in ination as
large in magnitude as those that would be considered optimal if the central bank could
42
be certain that the private sector would share its expectations about the economy's
future evolution.
Among the further implications of this change in the target criterion are the
fact that an optimal policy commitment no longer implies complete stationarity of
the long-run price level, as is true of the optimal policy prescription under rational
expectations. However, we do not feel that this result does much to weaken the case
for the desirability of a (suitably exible) price-level target. By comparison with
the type of forward-looking ination targets actually adopted by ination-targeting
central banks | under which temporary departures of the ination rate from its
long-run target are allowed to persist for a time and are certainly never reversed |
a price-level target, which would require temporary departures from the price-level
target path to eventually be reversed, would still be closer to the policy recommended
by our analysis. For while we show that the robustly optimal policy commitment
implies that there should be a unit root in the price level, the central bank's forecasted
change in the long-run price level in response to a shock should have the opposite sign
to the short-run eect on prices, rather than allowing a further cumulative change in
prices that is in the same direction as (and larger than) the initial eect on prices.
A commitment to maintain a xed target path for the price level | so that at least
short-run departures from the path would eventually be reversed | would represent
a change to something much closer to the robustly optimal policy, and would most
likely raise the welfare lower bound (even if not quite to its theoretical maximum
level), though we do not provide any explicit calculation of this gain here.
Our specic conclusions depend, of course, on a specic conception of which kinds
of departures from model-consistent expectations should be regarded as most plausi-
ble. We have proposed a non-parametric specication of the possible belief distortions
that is intended to be fairly exible. Nonetheless, we are well aware that in some
ways our specication remains fairly restrictive. In particular, our assumption that
the only belief distortions that are contemplated in the robust policy analysis are ones
that are absolutely continuous with respect to the policy analyst's own probability
measure | a restriction that was necessary in order for our relative entropy measure
of the \size" of belief distortions to be dened | is hardly an innocuous one. We
are concerned that this assumption may have an important eect on our results. It
implies that a determination on the part of the central bank to ensure that a certain
relation among variables will hold in all states of the world is sucient to ensure
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that the private sector cannot doubt that it will hold in all states of the world; and
such an assumption may well still exaggerate the extent to which central bank policy
commitments can shape private-sector expectations, even if not to the extent that an
assumption of fully model-consistent expectations would. This may lead us to exag-
gerate the value of a policy commitment to ination stabilization. An extension of
our analysis to allow for alternative denitions of \near-rational expectations" would
accordingly be of great value in further clarifying the nature of a robust approach to
the conduct of monetary policy.
44
References
Adam, K. (2004): \On the Relation Between Bayesian and Robust Decision Mak-
ing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28, 2105{2117.
Adam, K., and R. Billi (2007): \Discretionary Monetary Policy and the Zero
Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, 54,
728{752.
Adam, K., and R. M. Billi (2006): \Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment
with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," Journal of Money Credit and
Banking, 38(7), 1877{1905.
Benigno, P., and L. Paciello (2010): \Monetary Policy, Doubts and Asset
Prices," LUISS Guido Carli (Rome) working paper.
Benigno, P., and M. Woodford (2005): \Ination Stabilization And Welfare:
The Case Of a Distorted Steady State," Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation, 3, 1185{1236.
Calvo, G. A. (1983): \Staggered Contracts in a Utility-Maximizing Framework,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 383{398.
Clarida, R., J. Gal, and M. Gertler (1999): \The Science of Monetary Policy:
Evidence and Some Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1661{1707.
Eggertsson, G., and M. Woodford (2003): \The Zero Interest-Rate Bound and
Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (1), 139{211.
Giannoni, M., and M. Woodford (2010): \Optimal Target Criteria for Stabi-
lization Policy," NBER Working Paper no. 15757.
Hansen, L. P., and T. J. Sargent (2005): \Robust Estimation and Control under
Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, 124, 258{301.
Hansen, L. P., and T. J. Sargent (2008): Robustness. Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
(2011): \Wanting Robustness in Macroeconomics," inHandbook of Monetary
Economics, ed. by B.M.Friedman, andM. Woodford, vol. 3B. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
45
(2012): \Two Views of a Robust Ramsey Planner," unpublished, University
of Chicago, January.
Woodford, M. (2003): Interest and Prices. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
(2010): \Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy with Near-Rational Expecta-
tions," American Economic Review, 100, 274{303.
(2011): \Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy," in Handbook of Monetary
Economics, ed. by B. M. Friedman, and M. Woodford, vol. 3B. Elsevier, Amster-
dam.
Yun, T. (1996): \Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity, and Business
Cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, 27, 345{370.
46
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs for Section 2.2
Proof of the minmax inequality. Let us dene
m(c)  argmin
m
(m; c)
c(m)  argmax
c
(m; c)
m  argmin
m
(m; c(m));
then
max
c
min
m
(m; c)  max
c
(m; c)
= (m; c(m))
= min
m
(m; c(m))
= min
m
max
c
(m; c):
Proof of Proposition 1. We rst note that (x;m) is an equilibrium. This
follows directly from (7c), which only holds if F (x;m) = 0. Next, we show that a
triple (x;m; ) satisfying (7) delivers a weakly higher value than problem (5). Let 
xU ;mU

denote the solution to (5), then
W (xU) + V (mU) = min
m
max
x
W (x) + V (m) s.t. F (x;m) = 0
 max
x
W (x) + V (m) s.t. F (x;m) = 0 (76)
= W (x) + V (m):
The last equality follows from the fact that any alternative solution ex with ex 6= x
achieves a strictly lower value than x; using F (ex;m) = 0 and (7a), we have
W (ex) + V (m) = W (ex) + V (m) + F (ex;m)
= L(m; ex; )
< L(m; x; )
= W (x) + V (m):
It then follows from (5) and (4) that (x;m) also delivers a weakly higher value than
the the robustly optimal policy problem (3).
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A.2 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by log-linearizing the constraints (42)-(44)
around the deterministic steady state. Using Etm^t+1 = 0 this delivers
F^t = (1  )[fyY^t + f 0~t] + Et[(   1)t+1 + F^t+1]
K^t = (1  )[kyY^t + k0~t] + Et[(1 + !)t+1 + K^t+1]
^t = ^t 1; (77)
using the notation
F^t  log(Ft= F ); fy  @ log f
@ log Y
; f 0 
@ log f
@
;
and corresponding denitions when K replaces F and ~t for t   . Subtracting the
rst of these equations from the second, one obtains an equation that involves only
the variables K^t   F^t; t; Y^t; and the vector of disturbances t. Log-linearization of
(37) yields
t =
1  

1
1 + !
(K^t   F^t); (78)
and using this to substitute for K^t   F^t in the relation just mentioned, we obtain
t = [Y^t + u
0

~t] + Ett+1 (79)
as an implication of the log-linearized structural equations, where
  (1  )(1  )

! + ~ 1
1 + !
> 0; (80)
and
u0 
k0   f 0
ky   fy : (81)
This last expression is well-dened, since ky   fy = ! + ~ 1 > 0. Finally, using
the denition of the output gap (55) and of the mark-up disturbance (60), one can
rewrite equation (79) as
t = xt + Ett+1 + ut: (82)
Next, we log-linearize the FOCs (47){(50) around the steady-state values. Log-
linearizing (48){(49) yields the vector equation
  K
1  

(1 + !)
1 + !
[(K^t   F^t) + ^t 1]
"
1
 1
#
 e t + D(1)0e t 1 + CZ^t + D(1)0 m^t = 0; (83)
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where e t   t    ; Z^ 0t  [F^t K^t]0; m^t = logmt, and C is K times the Hessian matrix
of second partial derivatives of the function (Z)   0(Z): The fact that (Z) is
homogeneous of degree 1 implies that its derivatives are homogeneous of degree 0,
and hence functions only of K=F ; it follows that the matrix C is of the form
C = c
"
1  1
 1 1
#
; (84)
where c is a scalar given by
c =  1
F
K
 
 (1  )

(1 + !)
1 + !
 

(1  )

2
(1 + !)
1 + !
!
(85)
and satises c < 0 whenever steady state output falls short of its rst best level, as
then  1 > 0. Similarly, the fact that each element of (Z) is homogeneous of degree
1 implies that
D(1) e = e;
where e0  [1 1]:
Pre-multiplying (83) by e0 therefore yields
e0te  = e0t 1e t 1 (86)
for all t  0, which implies that e0te t converges to zero with probability 1, regard-
less of the realizations of the disturbances; hence under the optimal dynamics, the
asymptotic uctuations in the endogenous variables are such that
e 2;t =  e 1;t (87)
at all times. And if we assume an initial commitment of the kind that (87) is satised
also t = 0, as we do, then (87) will hold for all t  0.
There must also exist a vector v such that v2 6= v1 and such that D(1)v =  1v;
since 1= is one of the eigenvalues of the matrix D(1). (The vector v must also not
be a multiple of e, as e is the other right eigenvector, with associated eigenvalue 1.)
Pre-multiplying (83) by v0 then yields
  K
1  

(1 + !)
1 + !
[(K^t F^t)+^t 1]  ~ 1;t+~ 1;t 1 c (K^t F^t)+ 1m^t = 0: (88)
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Here the common factor v1   v2 6= 0 has been divided out from all terms, and ~ 2;t
has been eliminated using (87). Note that conditions (86) and (88) exhaust the
implications of (83), and hence of conditions (48){(49).
We now use the FOC (47) to eliminate ~ 1 in equation (88). Log-linearizing this
FOC yields
Y [UY Y +  
0zY Y ]Y^t + [U 0Y  +  
0zY ]~t + UY^t  
K
Y
(ky   fy)~ 1;t = 0:
Again using (87) to eliminate ~ 2;t and a log-linear approximation to (56) to eliminate
~t we can equivalently write this as
Y [UY Y +  
0zY Y ](Y^t   Y^ t ) + UY^t  
K
Y
(ky   fy)~ 1;t = 0: (89)
Using (89) to eliminate ~ 1 in (88), (78) to express K^t   F^t in terms of t, and (55)
one obtains
t + x(xt   xt 1) + mm^t + ^t 1 + 

^t   ^t 1

= 0 (90)
and
   


K
1  

(1 + !)
1 + !
+ c

 (1 + !)
1  
   

K
1  

(1 + !)
1 + !

x   
Y [UY Y +  
0zY Y ]
K
Y
(ky   fy)
    UYK
Y
(ky   fy)
m   1:
Since  < 0 and c < 0 when steady state output falls short of its rst best level 
Y < Y
e
, we have  > 0. In this case we also have  1 > 0, so that m > 0.
Moreover, in the case with suciently small steady state distortions, UY Y + 
0zY Y < 0.
Since ky   fy = ! + e 1 > 0, it then follows that x > 0.
Since the initial degree of price dispersion ^ 1 is assumed to be of second order
and since equation (77) implies that price dispersion remains of second order inde-
pendently of the realization of the stochastic disturbances, the rst order accurate
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optimal relationship (90) simplies to
t + x(xt   xt 1) + mm^t = 0: (91)
For the sake of brevity, we skip the log-linearization of the FOC (50), which only
serves to determine the value of the Lagrange multiplier t.
Finally, it remains to log-linearize the FOC (51)
( Z)0~ t 1 + K 0D(1)Z^t + m^t + ~ t 1 = 0:
Applying the expectations operator Et 1 to the previous equation, subtracting the
result from it, and using  0D(1) =  0 and  1 =  2 yields
m^t =
K 1


K^t   F^t

  Et 1[K^t   F^t]

:
Using once more (78) gives
m^t = m (t   Et 1[t]) ; (92)
with
m =
K 1

 (1 + !)
1   :
Again in with Y < Y
e
it follows from  1 > 0 that m > 0. Equations (91), (92), and
(82) are those stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove that the saddle point properties (7a) and
(7b) hold at the steady state. Continuity then insures that the same applies in a
small enough neighborhood around the steady state.
Since mt = 1 in steady state, inequality in (7a) follows from results derived in
Benigno and Woodford (2005) who show that the Lagrangian (45) is locally concave
(on the set of paths consistent with the model structural relations) near the optimal
steady state if the dierence between steady state output and the ecient output
level is suciently small.
Since the Lagrangian (45) is locally convex in mt+1 (it contains only terms linear
in mt+1 and the convex term mt+1 logmt+1) the rst order conditions for the optimal
choice (92) indeed determine a minimum for the Lagrangian, so that inequality (7b)
also holds.
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A.3 Proofs for Section 6
To prove proposition 4, we use two auxiliary results, that we prove below:
Lemma 1 Let c be a policy commitment that satises Assumptions 1 and 2. Then
under this policy commitment, the equilibrium dynamics of f ~Yt; ~t; ~Ft; ~Kt; ~tg are
unaected to rst order by the belief distortions. Moreover, to second order, the
equilibrium dynamics depend at most linearly on the belief distortions fmtg, but are
otherwise independent of them.
Lemma 2 Let c be a policy commitment that satises Assumptions 1 and 2. Then
there exists a neighborhood of 1 such that the function (m; c) is a strictly convex
function of m on the domain M, dened as the set of all belief distortions such that
mt+1 remains forever within that neighborhood.
Given these results, we are able to prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4:. For some neighborhood of 1, let M be the set of
belief distortions such that mt+1 remains in this neighborhood at all times; and for
some neighborhood N of the steady-state values of the endogenous variables, let X be
the set of all paths x for the endogenous variables along which the period-t variables
remain within N at all times. Then our local characterization of the upper-bound
solution implies that there exist neighborhoods for which the upper-bound dynamics
x and the associated worst-case belief distortions m solve the problem
min
m2M
max
x2X
[W (x) + V (m)] s.t. F (x;m) = 0: (93)
Here x and m refer to the exact solutions to the nonlinear FOCs characterizing the
upper-bound dynamics (rather than to the log-linear approximation to these dynamics
that we have computed); our local analysis above implies that such solutions exist, at
least in the case of a tight enough bound jjjj on the exogenous disturbances, though it
cannot tell us whether these dynamics would also represent a global minmax solution
if we were to relax the bounds on M and X .
Our goal is to show that for an appropriate choice of the bounds that dene the
class of policy commitments C, and any outcome function with the property assumed
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in the proposition,
max
c2C
min
m2M
[W (O(m; c)) + V (m)] = min
m2M
max
x2X
[W (x) + V (m)] s.t. F (x;m) = 0:
(94)
so that the commitment c that solves this local version of the robustly optimal policy
problem (the problem on the left-hand side of (94)) implements the upper-bound
dynamics. We have already established in section 2.2 the upper bounds
max
c2C
min
m2M
(m; c)  min
m2M
max
c2C
(m; c) (95)
 min
m2M
max
x2X
[W (x) + V (m)] s.t. F (x;m) = 0; (96)
where (m; c) is again shorthand for the objective function in the robustly optimal
policy problem. It therefore suces for this step of the proof that we establish that
both inequalities hold with equality, under the conditions assumed in the proposition.
This will establish the existence of a c that attains the upper bound; the construction
used to show it will also imply that c coincides with c to a log-linear approximation.
The proof proceeds in stages.
(1) We rst establish that (96) holds with equality. We begin by noting that (93)
implies that for suitable boundsM and X , it must be the case that for any m 2M;
there exists an allocation xm 2 X such that F (xm;m) = 0, and
W (xm) + V (m)  W (x) + V (m): (97)
Moreover, there must exist a commitment cm 2 C that implements the outcome xm
in the case of belief distortions m. Fixing m, for each possible date and state of the
world, let c^t  ct(xm); where ct() is the function that species commitment c at that
date and in that state of the world. Then we can dene a policy commitment cm by
a sequence of functions fcmt()g, where cmt(x)  ct(x)   c^t for each date and each
possible state of the world. The policy commitment cm is, by construction, consistent
with the DEE outcome xm in the case of belief distortions m. We wish to show that
policy cm is also consistent with the existence of a nearby DEE outcome in the case
of any belief distortions that are close enough to m, so that cm is an element of the
class C:
Consider the set of (exact, nonlinear) structural equations that dene a DEE, in
the case of arbitrary belief distortions m and an arbitrary policy commitment of the
form
ct(x) = c^t; (98)
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for some process fc^tg (not necessarily the one that denes the commitment cm).
When there are no belief distortions and c^t = 0 at all times, this system of equations
has a locally unique solution, by condition 2 of Assumption 2, which is equal to the
steady-state values of the endogenous variables if the exogenous disturbances take
their steady-state values. Hence log-linearization of the system around the steady
state (and this policy commitment) must yield a log-linear system with a unique
bounded solution for the endogenous variables in the case of any bounded distur-
bance processes, under the assumption of rational expectations. It follows (since the
conditions for a unique bounded solution are exactly the same when additional ad-
ditive disturbance terms are added to the structural equations) that the log-linear
system also has a unique bounded solution for the endogenous variables in the case of
any bounded processes ft; m^t; c^tg: This then implies that the original (exact, nonlin-
ear) structural equations have a locally unique solution for the endogenous variables
in the case of any small enough perturbations of the exogenous disturbance process,
the belief distortions, or the process fc^tg that denes the policy commitment.
It is therefore possible to choose the bounds jjjj;N ;M tight enough so that (i)
condition (93) holds, and (ii) for any disturbance process satisfying the bound and
any m 2 M, there is a unique DEE consistent with the policy commitment cm in
which the endogenous variables remain forever within the neighborhood N ; and the
allocation associated with this DEE is xm: It follows that for any m 2M; the policy
commitment cm dened above belongs to the class C: Moreover, for any outcome
function O(m; c) with the property assumed in the proposition, we must have
O(m; cm) = xm
for any m 2M:
It then follows from (97) that
max
c2C
(m; c)  (m; cm) = W (O(m; cm)) + V (m)  W (x) + V (m)
for any m 2 M: Hence the minimum value of the left-hand expression (minimizing
over m 2 M) must also be at least as large as the right-hand expression. Since (96)
asserts that it is also no greater, the two expressions must be equal. This establishes
that (96) holds as an equality.
(2) Before completing the demonstration of (94), we dene a policy commitment
c that can be shown to solve the problem on the left-hand side of (94). Let c be
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the commitment cm (dened above) in the case that m = m
: It follows from the
discussion above that O(m; c) = x; so that (m; c) = W (x) + V (m): the
minmax value of the problem on right-hand side of (96).
By the denition of the upper-bound solution, x is (at least locally) the best
DEE consistent with belief distortions m; then since c achieves this level of the
policymaker's objective, c must also be a best-response policy commitment within
the class of policies C; so that
max
c2C
(m; c) = (m; c): (99)
And it is similarly evident that m must be a solution to the outer problem on the
right-hand side of (95).
We further note that, to a log-linear approximation, c is identical to c: Each is a
commitment of the form (98); they dier only to the extent that the process fc^tg is
dierent in the two cases. In the case of policy c, the process fc^tg is obtained as
c^t = ct(x
):
But, by condition 1 of Assumption 2, the functions ct() are all consistent with the
upper-bound solution, at least to a log-linear approximation. This implies that in that
log-linear approximation, c^t = 0 at all times. Hence in the log-linear approximation,
c and c are identical policies.
(3) Finally, we establish that (95) holds with equality as well, and that c is a
policy commitment that achieves the upper bound. Given the results of step (2) of
the proof, we can alternatively write the proposition that we wish to establish as
max
c2C
min
m2M
(m; c) = (m; c): (100)
Moreover, it will suce to prove that
min
m2M
(m; c) = (m; c): (101)
For we already know from (95) that there exists no commitment c for which minm (m; c)
is larger than (m; c); since (101) suces to ensure that the bound can be obtained,
it will imply (100). Furthermore, it implies that c is a policy commitment that
achieves the bound.
55
Let us dene the function

(m)  max
c2C
(m; c)
for arbitrary m 2M: It follows from the discussion in step (2) that
min
m2M

(m) = 
(m) = (m; c);
and hence that

m(m
) = 0:
But by the envelope theorem, 
m(m
) = m(m; c); so that we must have
m(m
; c) = 0: (102)
Finally, let us consider the function (m)  (m; c); also dened for arbitrary
m 2 M: We wish to show that m minimizes this function (at least locally). By
(102), m is a critical point of the function, so it suces to show that (m) is a
strictly convex function of m, at least for m in a neighborhood of m: By Lemma 2,
(m; c) is (at least locally) a strictly convex function, for any commitment c satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1 and 2. But we have shown that c is an example of a commitment
satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, and so the lemma can be applied. It follows that
(m) is a strictly convex function of m, for m in some neighborhood of the undis-
torted beliefs. By choosing tight enough bounds jjjj, we can ensure that m is in the
neighborhood on which the function is strictly convex, and hence it is strictly convex
in a neighborhood of m.
This establishes that we can dene the bounds so that (101) holds, from which
(100) follows. It then follows directly that (95) holds with equality, and that the
commitment c dened in step (2) is an example of a policy that solves the local
robust policy problem. Hence c is equivalent, to a log-linear approximation, to the
solution to the local robust policy problem, and the value of the objective achieved by
the locally robustly optimal policy is the one achieved by the upper-bound solution.
We now prove Lemmas 1 and 2, required for the above proof. (The proof of
Proposition 4 relies upon Lemma 2, which in turn relies upon Lemma 1.) We rst
note that a DEE consistent with a policy commitment c of the kind assumed in
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the lemmas, and with given belief distortions m, corresponds to a set of processes
fYt; Ft; Kt; it;tg1t=0 satisfying the conditions
uY (Yt; t) = Et

mt+1uY (Yt+1; t+1)
1 + it
t+1
1  gt
1  gt+1

(103)
Ft = f(Yt; t) + Et

mt+1
 1
t+1Ft+1

(104)
Kt = k(Yt; t) + Et
h
mt+1
(1+!)
t+1 Kt+1
i
(105)
t = ~h(t 1; Kt=Ft) (106)
Etmt+1 = 1
ct() = 0 (107)
for all t.
The problem dening worst-case belief distortions in the case of the policy c is
then
min
fmt+1;Yt;Ft;Kt;it;tg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t [U(Yt;t; t) + mt+1 logmt+1] (108)
+  0 1(Z0) (109)
subject to constraints (103){(107), where  0 1(Z0) captures an initial precommit-
ment to achieve a time-invariant solution, as in problem (45). In the case of a policy
commitment c satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, there will be a locally unique DEE
(solution to equations (103){(106) and (107)) in the case of any given small enough
belief distortions m, and this will have to be the allocation given by the outcome
function. The value of the objective function in (109) for those belief distortions will
then dene the objective (m; c) in our reduced-form statement of the robustly opti-
mal policy problem. Lemmas 1 and 2 state some properties of local approximations
to the solutions to these equations.
Proof of Lemma 1:. We rst prove that the solution for the endogenous
variables f ~Yt; ~t; ~Ft; ~Kt; ~tg, in the case of arbitrary (small) belief distortions, is
unaected by the belief distortions up to rst order. To do so, we linearize the
system of nonlinear equations listed above.
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Dening the exogenous process Yt =
Ct
1 gt and noting that uY (Yt; t) = (Yt=
Yt)
 1=e (1  gt),
we can rewrite equation (103) as
Yt
Y t
 1=e
= Et
"
mt+1

Yt+1
Y t+1
 1=e
1 + it
t+1
#
:
Denoting exogenous terms by e.t., using Et bmt+1 = 0 and (1 + {) = 1, a linear
approximation to this equation is given by
  e 1Y ~Yt = Et[ e 1Y ~Yt+1 + ~{t   ~t+1] + e:t:+O(kk2): (110)
Next, we linearize (104) and (105):
~Ft = fY ~Yt + Et
h
(   1)F et+1 + ~Ft+1i+ e:t+O(kk2) (111)
~Kt = kY ~Yt + Et
h
((1 + !))Ket+1 + ~Kt+1i+ e:t:+O(kk2): (112)
Subtracting the rst from the second equation and using K = F
~Kt   ~Ft = (kY   fY ) ~Yt + Et
h
(1 + !)Ket+1 +  ~Kt+1   ~Ft+1i
+ e:t+O(kk2):
A linear approximation to (106) delivers
et = (1  )

1
1 + !
1
K
 eKt   ~Ft+O(kk2);
so that
et = (kY   fY ) 1  K (1 + !) ~Yt + Et het+1i+ e:t+O(kk2): (113)
Note that equations (110)-(113) are independent of the belief distortions up to rst
order, and thus identical as in the case with rational private sector expectations.
Since the policy commitment c is also assumed independent of the belief distortions
and because c insures a locally determinate outcome under rational expectations,
equations (110)-(113) have a locally unique solution that | to rst-order accuracy
| is independent of the belief distortions.
We now show that to second order, the solution for
n
~Yt; ~t; ~Ft; ~Kt; ~t
o
depends
only linearly on f ~mtg. Since up to rst order the solution
n
~Yt; ~t; ~Ft; ~Kt; ~t
o
evolves
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independently of the belief distortions, a quadratic approximation to equation (103)
is given by
 e 1Y ~Yt = Et[ e 1Y ~Yt+1 + ~{t   ~t+1   e 1Y ~Yt+1 ~mt+1   ~t+1 ~mt+1 + e 1Y eY t+1 ~mt+1]
+ t:i:m+ e:t:+O(kk3):
The only new terms appearing in a quadratic approximation are thus either indepen-
dent of the belief distortions (as they involve squares of the variables ~Yt; ~t; ~Ft; ~Kt; ~t
and exogenous terms) or of the form Et ~Xt+1 ~mt+1, where ~Xt+1 is a variable indepen-
dent of the belief distortions. The same can be noted when quadratically approxi-
mating (104), (105) and (106). Moreover, a quadratic approximation to the policy
commitment involves no terms in ~m. We can thus perform the same steps as in the lin-
earization above and solve for a unique non-explosive solution for
n
~Yt; ~t; ~Ft; ~Kt;t
o
,
which is accurate to second order. The only newly appearing terms will be t:i:m and
terms linear in em, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2:. Let c be a policy commitment satisfying Assumptions
1 and 2. The problem dening worst-case belief distortions is then given by (109).
When the exogenous disturbances take their steady-state values at all times, the
locally unique DEE consistent with zero belief distortions is given by the steady
state. We wish to consider the value (m; c) of the objective in (109) in the case
that both belief distortions and the exogenous disturbances are small; in such a case,
the DEE allocation will be correspondingly close to the steady state. We locally
approximate (m; c) through Taylor series expansions around the steady-state values
of all variables.
From Lemma 1 we know that the variables ( ~Yt; ~t; ~Ft; ~Kt; ~t) are to rst order
independent of the belief distortions. A second-order accurate approximation of the
objective function in problem (109) is thus given by
E0
1X
t=0
t

U(Yt;t; t) + mt+1 logmt+1 +  
0
 1(Z0)

= E0
1X
t=0
t
"
UY ~Yt + U ~t +
1
2
 ( ~mt+1)
2 +  0 1D(1)
 
~F0
~K0
!#
+ t:i:m+O(kk3); (114)
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where t:i:m refers to (rst- and higher-order) terms that are independent of the
belief distortion process m. Lemma 1 also implies that the endogenous variablesn
~Yt; ~t; ~F0; ~K0
o
showing up in (114) depend up to second-order accuracy only linearly
on the chosen process for the belief distortions f ~mt+1g, but are otherwise independent
of the choices of the belief distortions (to second-order accuracy). Strict convexity
of (114) is thus implied by the quadratic term in ~m, so that second-order conditions
for the worst-case belief distortions problem necessarily hold at the solution to the
rst-order conditions.
Proof of corollary 3:. Suppose policy commits to the targeting rule (71) from
date t onwards. To establish determinacy of the solution under rational expectations
with such a commitment, we have to analyze the system of equations
t+j + x(xt+j   xt+j 1) + mm (t+j   Et+j 1[t+j]) = 0 (115)
t+j   xt+j   Et+jt+j+1   ut+j = 0; (116)
which holds for all j  0. Taking the expectation Et 1[] and rearranging terms
delivers a system describing the dynamics of the t   1 dated expectations of the
endogenous variables 
Et 1t+j
Et 1xt+j
!
=
 
 1

1 +  
x

 

  
x
1
! 
Et 1t+j
Et 1xt+j 1
!
+
 
  1
0
!
Et 1ut+j:
Under the additional assumptions stated in the corollary, we have x > 0;  > 0,
and  > 0, so that the characteristic polynomial of the autoregressive matrix in the
preceding equation implies that both roots are positive with one root being explosive
and one being stable. Since Et 1xt 1 is predetermined at date t, the previous equation
system has a unique non-explosive solution for the dynamics of Et 1t+j and Et 1xt+j
for all j  0, given any bounded path for Et 1ut+j for all j  0. Repeating this
procedure for any date h  t   1 determines also unique non-explosive values for
Eht+j and Ehxt+j for all j > h   t. Taking the expectation Et 1[] of equations
(115) and (116) and subtracting the corresponding results from equations (115) and
(116), respectively, delivers for j = 0
( + mm) (t   Et 1[t]) + x(xt   Et 1xt) = 0
t   Et 1[t]  (xt   Et 1xt)   (Ett+1   Et 1t+1)  (ut   Et 1ut) = 0;
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which uniquely determines t and xt as a linear function of the already determined ex-
pectations (Et 1t; Et 1t+1; Ett+1; Et 1xt) and the exogenous terms (ut+j Et 1ut+j).
Repeating this last step for each j > 0 determines the locally unique state contingent
path for ft+j; xt+jg and completes the proof of local determinacy of the outcome
under rational expectations.
A.4 Proofs for Section 7.1
Derivation of the best response dynamics (74). Equation (73) implies
t =  x(xt   xt 1)  mm^t (117)
and substituting into (72)delivers
Et

xt+1   (1 +  + 
x
)xt + xt 1

=

x
ut +
m
x
m^t: (118)
The lag polynomial on the l.h.s. can be expressed as
L

L 2   (1 +  + 
x
)L 1 + 1

=  e1(1  (e1L) 1)(1  e2L);
where e1 and e2 solve e
2   (1 +  + 
x
)e + 1 and satisfy e1 > 
 1 and e2 2 (0; 1):
Using the lag polynomial, we can write (118) as
 e1Et

(1  (e1L) 1)(1  e2L)xt

=

x
ut +
m
x
m^t
 e1(1  e2L)xt = 
x
Et

(1  (e1L) 1) 1ut

+
m
x
Et

(1  (e1L) 1) 1m^t

:
Assuming that ut evolves according to (61) and using Et[m^t+j] = 0 for all j  1 we
have
 e1(1  e2L)xt = 
x
1
1  =e1ut +
m
x
m^t:
Solving for x1 gives
xt = e2xt 1   
x
1
e1   ut  
1
e1
m
x
m^t;
which is the upper row in (74). Substituting this into (117) delivers the lower row in
(74).
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Proof of Proposition 6. Let m denote a state contingent belief distortion and
 a state contingent ination commitment. Similarly, let (m; ) the corresponding
contingent sequences of the the upper bound solution. Letting BR denote the best
response function for ination, we have that  = BR(m). Furthermore, letting
O(;m) denote the objective function of the policymaker, we know from corollary 1
that
O(;m) < O(;m);
for all m 6= m. Since
O(;m)  max

O(;m) = O(BR(m);m);
this implies that
O(;m) < O(BR(m);m)
for all m 6= m. This shows that the worst-case belief distortions are given by m
whenever the policymaker has committed to the best-response function BR().
A.5 Proofs for Section 7.2
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider problem (75). The rst-order condition for it 1
is given by
Et 1[
tmt+1uY (Yt+1; t+1)
1
t+1
1 + gt
1 + gt+1
] = 0
and linearizing this around the optimal steady state where 
 = 0 delivers
Et 1
h
~
t
i
= 0: (119)
The rst order condition for mt is given by
(1 + logmt) +  
0
t 1(Zt) +  t 1 + 
t 1uY (Yt; t)
1 + it 2
t
1 + gt 1
1 + gt
= 0
and its linearization by
m^t +  K 
0
D(1) bZt + (Z)0~ t 1 + e t 1 +  1 ~
t 1 = 0:
Applying the operator Et 1 [] to this equation, subtracting the result from it and
using (119) gives
m^t +  K 
0
D(1)
 bZt   Et 1 bZt = 0:
Using a log-linearization of (37) then delivers (59).
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